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Abstract 
Suppose that two competing norms, N1 and N2, can be identified such that a given person’s 
response can be interpreted as correct according to N1 but incorrect according to N2. Which of 
these two norms, if any, should one use to interpret such a response? In this paper we seek to 
address this fundamental problem by studying individual variation in the interpretation of 
conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their case 
judgments and reflective attitudes. To investigate the participants’ reflective attitudes we 
introduce a new experimental paradigm called the Scorekeeping Task. As a case study, we 
identify the participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals (N1) versus 
Inferentialism (N2) and investigate to what extent internally consistent competence models 
can be reconstructed for the participants on this basis. After extensive empirical 
investigations, an apparent reasoning error with and-to-if inferences was found in one of these 
two groups. The implications of this case study for debates on the proper role of normative 
considerations in psychology are discussed. 
 
 Keywords: problem of arbitration, conditionals, and-to-if inferences, relevance, 
reflective attitudes, Bayesian mixture modeling 
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Norm Conflicts and Conditionals1 
 In this paper we put forward an experimental framework for dealing with cases of 
conflicting norm in psychological research. This problem arises when multiple norms can be 
applied to reasoning tasks, which yield conflicting verdicts on what counts as correct 
reasoning. A good example is Wason’s selection task (Wason, 1968), in which participants 
are asked to select which of four cards to turn over in order to find out whether a certain 
conditional rule (that is a rule with the structure ‘'if A, then C') is true or false. In its original 
version, Wason’s task was only solved as intended by a small minority of the most 
cognitively able participants (ca. 10%). Many variations of this classical task have been 
explored in more than 300 published articles (Ragni, Kola, and Johnson-Laird, 2017). Most 
importantly, however, the exceedingly poor performance of participants observed by Wason 
prompted the development of alternative theoretical accounts that, based on information 
theory (Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Klauer, 1999) or a different semantics of the conditional 
(Baratgin, Over, and Politzer, 2013), recast the majority of the responses as rational. Recently, 
Elqayam & Evans (2011) criticized such developments by arguing that they involve a 
fallacious “is-to-ought’ inference: one cannot infer from the fact that something is the case 
that it should be the case (e.g., the fact that cash payments to avoid taxes are common does 
not imply that tax avoidance is legitimate). In other words, descriptive facts about what is or 
is not the case do not license normative conclusions about what ought to be the case. This 
characterization of what have been extremely influential developments in the study of 
reasoning is a central plank in Elqayam and Evans’ (2011) argument against a central role for 
                                                 
1  Acknowledgement: We would like to thank the audiences at the following conferences 
for their valuable feedback: European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Rijeka 2018; 
Annual Meeting of New Frameworks of Rationality, 2017; Meeting of the Cognitive Science 
Society, 2017, London; Reasoning Club, 2017, Turin; International Conference of Thinking, 
2016, Providence. We furthermore thank Shira Elqayam, Keith Stenning, David Over, 
Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Wolfgang Spohn, Eric Raidl, Igor Douven, and Mike 
Oaksford for important discussions and students (esp. Hannes Krahl, Mareike Makosch, 
Johanna Weymann, Markus Steiner, and Lucy Ungerathen) for their help. 
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normative considerations in the study of higher level cognition more generally. Elqayam and 
Evans argue that theories of higher mental processing would be better off if freed from 
normative considerations, not just in the area of reasoning, but also in judgement and 
decision-making.  
This recommendation is not only at odds with long research traditions in those areas, 
but also comes after two decades of expansion of normatively oriented approaches and 
explanations within domains such as categorization, language processing, language learning, 
memory processes, and perception, in the form of ideal observer models (e.g., Geisler, 2011),  
Bayesian models of cognition (Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010) or 
“rational analysis” (Anderson, 1991; Chater & Oaksford, 1998). It is thus unsurprising that 
Elqayam and Evans’ suggestions prompted vigorous debate (see e.g. the open peer 
commentary to Elqayam & Evans, 2011; or the papers in Elqayam & Over, 2016). This 
debate is itself part of a wider foundational discussion not just about psychological methods, 
but also about the quality and nature of psychological theorizing and explanation (see e.g., 
Gigerenzer, 1998; Jones & Love, 2011; Bowers & Davis, 2012; Chater et al., 2006; Chater, 
2009; Hahn, 2014; Chater et al., 2018).  
 In this paper, we seek to advance this debate by focusing on a central issue for 
normatively oriented theorizing across these areas, namely the issue of arbitration between 
competing norms with respect to participant performance. Specifically, we seek to provide 
both conceptual clarification vis a vis charges of fallacious is-to-ought inference and provide a 
novel methodological tool for use in these contexts. The tool is a new experimental task we 
have called the Scorekeeping Task, which is used in tandem with Bayesian mixture models to 
develop profiles of the participants at the individual level. We use this task in a case study: 
investigation of how individuals think about indicative conditionals, natural language 
statements such as ‘If I forget to pay the rent, then my landlord will complain’ that follow the 
general form ‘if A, then C’, as prompted by Wason’s original (1968) research. Through 
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application of the Scorekeeping Task to a currently contentious issue in the study of 
conditional reasoning, we will show how this method defuses arguments about the 
inappropriate use of normative considerations, how it clarifies the respective roles of 
normative and descriptive considerations, and how it provides novel empirical and theoretical 
insights into a core question of how conditionals are represented and used by people.  
 The paper proceeds in three parts: In the first, we detail further the normative debate 
and conceptual issues. In the second part, we describe the empirical case study and its 
findings. In the third and final part, we discuss the wider implications not just to the study of 
reasoning but to examples of norm conflict in other areas of cognition.  
 
The Normative Foundation 
One common strategy in cognitive science consists of using normative theories as competence 
models describing the idealized knowledge possessed by an agent in a given domain (e.g. 
sentence parsing, deductive reasoning, or decision making) upon which processing is based. 
Since the competence models prove to be too efficient in solving the problems vis-á-vis 
psychologically realistic performance, they are augmented through independently testable 
assumptions about performance factors (e.g. working memory constraints) involved in 
applying the idealized knowledge, which may lead to performance errors (Cooper, 2002). A 
fruitful way to view the competence models of logic, probability theory, and decision theory 
is as providing consistency conditions on belief, degrees of belief, and choices, respectively 
(Chater and Oaksford, 2012). However, care needs to be taken since competing formal 
systems exist, for example, non-monotonic logic as an alternative to classical logic (Stenning 
and van Lambalgen, 2008), ranking theory as an alternative to probability theory (Spohn, 
2012), and risk-weighted expected utility theory as an alternative to expected utility theory 
(Buchak, 2013). So what we can say is that each of these systems codifies one way of being 
consistent within their respective domains. 
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 The normative foundation of our individual-profiling approach to the problem of 
arbitration has two legs to stand on. The first is the Principle of Charity, which says roughly 
that we should choose as a default interpretation the one that renders participants rational, 
when the data allow for a choice (Thagard and Nisbett, 1983; C. J. Lee, 2006). The second is 
a modification of Carnap's (1937) Principle of Tolerance. According to Carnap, only external, 
pragmatic reasons can be given for adopting a particular logical framework, but each logical 
system should be well-formed and come with its own framework-internal notion of what 
counts as correct reasoning (Steinberger, 2016). We have argued elsewhere that those 
‘pragmatic reasons’ ideally need to be formally elucidated themselves (see e.g., Corner & 
Hahn, 2013; Hahn, 2014), an issue we return to later in this paper. However, in this paper, we 
are not interested in making claims about the normative status of the formal theories per se. 
We note only that we believe, in general, that people may value different epistemic goods and 
so could rationally come to choose different rational norms. In keeping with this, our 
modified Principle of Tolerance permits different participants to adopt divergent norms when 
approaching a reasoning task. 
 Chater and Oaksford's (2012) focus on the consistency conditions imposed by 
normative theories is important since consistency makes up a minimal condition for any well-
formed, formal system. So through the requirement that regardless of which reasoning system 
the participants adopt, it should at least be well-formed, we use internal consistency as a 
constraint on our competence models. One goal of the empirical investigations is then to 
probe how far we can succeed in reconstructing consistent competence models of the 
participants, when we charitably allow participants to adopt different norms. Our individual-
profiling approach thereby assesses the participants only relative to a reasoning system that 
they have themselves committed to. In this, we follow Stenning and van Lambalgen (2004, 
2008), who make the observation that competing logics (e.g. classical logic, intuitionistic 
logic, non-monotonic logic, deontic logic) can be represented as a choice of parameters like a) 
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selection of formal language, b) its semantics, and c) a definition of valid arguments in the 
language. Their point is that before we can even begin to assess the performance of 
participants, we need to gain independent evidence of the participants’ choices with respect to 
a), b), and c) in order to have a well-defined problem. Ultimately, their goal is to show that 
there is wide individual variation concerning these parameter settings, and that once we map 
out these sources of individual variation, much of what has been diagnostized as reasoning 
errors (e.g. in the Wason selection task) will diminish.  
To take another much discussed example, in the literature on the conjunction fallacy, 
measures have been taken to ensure that participants have the right understanding of 
probability (Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999), and accept basic entailments (‘A and B ⊨ A?’)  
(Tentori, Bonini, and Osherson, 2004) that would commit them to the requirement that P(A 
and B) ≤ P(A). The present approach goes further by virtue of its focus on individual variation 
and in its recommendation that the attribution of reasoning errors should only be made based 
on independent evidence concerning the adherence of each individual to a given set of norms. 
 The moderate relativism underlying relative attributions of reasoning errors constitutes 
a radical departure from the tradition in psychology of designing experiments with one 
preconceived notion of correct reasoning. Such a moderate relativism is also found in the 
approaches of Elqayam (2012) or Stupple and Ball (2014). Our own approach differs from 
those in a number of ways, however. First, as this paper seeks to argue, we believe there is a 
unique role for normative theories in the study of cognition, whereas the grounded-rationality 
approach in Elqayam (2012) takes an essentially descriptive stance to psychology. 
Furthermore, whereas Elqayam (2012) holds that reasoning according to Bayes' rule is a 
normative requirement only for participants who adopt the epistemic goal of conforming to 
this rule, we maintain that this requirement may follow from other commitments that 
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participants adopt.2 As we will discuss below, one of the key arguments in the literature on 
the normative foundations of Bayesianism demonstrates how, for a particular measure of 
inaccuracy, minimizing the inaccuracy of one’s beliefs requires “being Bayesian”, that is, 
assigning subjective degrees of belief in line with the probability calculus and using Bayes’ 
rule for belief revision (Pettigrew, 2016). What is at issue here is a wider point: ‘norm 
endorsement’, as Elqayam envisions it, may indeed provide a basis for “ought”: “I ought to 
exercise, because I feel I ought to exercise” is one potential way of providing a descriptive 
basis for a normative claim in order to bridge the difficulty of is to ought inference (for more 
detailed discussion see Corner & Hahn, 2013). However, such endorsement or ‘norm 
adoption’ does not have to be bestowed in a piece by piece fashion, because putatively 
normative formal systems are exactly that, systems. This means that anyone who wishes to 
assign probabilities is, on some level or other, normatively committed to assigning coherent 
probabilities (i.e., in line with the axioms of probability theory, see e.g., Jaynes, 2003), 
because that is what “probability” means. To illustrate with simple examples, someone who 
wishes to assign probabilities to events must, on some level accept the fact that the 
conjunction fallacy is an error, that is, a norm violation.3 And this is true even for a resource 
limited cognitive agent who generates the conjunction fallacy only due to some internal noise 
(Costello & Watts, 2014), or because they are using a cheap and cheerful averaging strategy 
which suffices for their present needs given their aims and resource constraints (Juslin, Nilson 
& Winman, 2009). In other words, the reasoner might not care much about the error itself, or 
even be able to realistically do much about it, and such considerations should certainly be 
                                                 
2  For instance, Costello and Watts (2014) argue that individuals will conform to the 
axioms of probability theory when generating probability estimates based on the count of 
retrieved instances as these conform to the basic principles of set theory that underlie 
probabilities.  
3 We are here using 'conjunction' as a technical term referring to a logical/probabilistic 
relationship rather than as referring to natural language "AND", which may be interpreted in 
different ways. For instance, ‘Kiss my dog and you’ll get fleas’ conveys the conditional 
meaning “If you kiss my dog you’ll get fleas” (Bhatt and Pancheva, 2006).   
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included in one’s evaluation of the system. But the conjunction error will still be an error, by 
virtue of the fact that the agent has agreed to assign probabilities in the first place.  
 These considerations reveal the fundamental role of consistency in evaluating not just 
reasoning, but also argumentation, judgment, or decision-making performance. Consequently, 
we constrain relativism on a theoretical level through the requirement that the competence 
models should be well-formed formal systems and should meet minimal consistency 
requirements, and that these systems ultimately have a well-founded pragmatic justification. 
And on a practical level, consistency is a cornerstone of our tests.  
 
Eliciting Reflective Attitudes through the Scorekeeping Task 
One way of guarding against attributing reasoning errors based on a mere case of 
miscommunication between the participant and the experimenter (Hilton, 1995) is to use the 
participants' considered judgments as a basis for the assessment. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) treated judgments as fallacies (as opposed to 'errors', or 'misunderstandings') only 
when participants were disposed to accept (after suitable explanation) that they had made a 
non-trivial, conceptual error; an error which the participants had the competence to avoid. In 
other words, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) consider it to be diagnostic of the presence of a 
fallacy that the participants could be brought to realize that they have made a mistake based 
on a conceptual misunderstanding.4 Similar requirements concerning the need for the agents’ 
considered judgments figure in the discussion of apparent violations of decision theory in 
Macnamara (1986), Spohn (1993), and Bermudez (2011, Chap. 2).  
                                                 
4  But as pointed out by a reviewer, Tversky and Kahneman may not have implemented 
this requirement generally in their other work on cognitive illusions outside the conjunction 
fallacy. However, Slovic & Tversky (1974) adopted a related approach when studying 
paradoxes of decision theory, and more recently Keith Stanovich reviewed a body of research 
on participants’ postexperimental endorsement of the rational principles they violated (Chater 
et al., 2018, pp. 811).   
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Implicit here is the assumption that it is the considered judgments/choices, or 
reflective attitudes, of a participant that reveals the normative principles that this person is 
committed to (Stein, 1996, Chap. 5). As part of a charitable assessment, it is therefore worth 
exploring new ways of designing experiments for eliciting participants' reflective attitudes.  
One influential method of eliciting reflective attitudes is through reflective equilibrium 
(Goodman, 1965; Rawls, 1971). Reflective equilibrium is a method for arriving at considered 
judgments based on the coherence of case judgments and endorsed principles. The goal is to 
strike a balance between having to accept counterintuitive judgments of cases based on 
endorsed principles and judging contrasting cases in a way which can be consistently codified 
in a set of principles. In Spohn (1993), it is argued that normative principles are the outcome 
of a reflective equilibrium and that these normative principles enter into a wider reflective 
equilibrium with a charitable interpretation of the participants’ responses. The method of 
reflective equilibrium is appropriate for eliciting considered judgments in academic 
disciplines, but requires a level of cognitive resources that makes it less suited for naive 
participants (but see Stupple and Ball, 2014).  
A different approach to eliciting the participants' reflective attitudes is adopted by 
Kneer and Machery (2019). In relation to moral judgments, they argue that isolated case 
judgments in between-subject designs are prone to the influences of performance errors like 
hindsight bias. As a solution, they propose a test of participants' moral competence based on 
the considered judgments they make when comparing multiple cases that differ in important 
conceptual dimensions (for related concerns, see Birnbaum, 1999). In addition, Kneer and 
Machery also investigated the participants' endorsement of abstract principles and found it to 
be moderately correlated with their other measures. 
Given well-known findings showing that participants often lack introspective access to 
the psychological processes that lead to their responses and tend to confabulate a 
rationalization if asked for the reasons behind their responses (for a review, see Evans, 2007, 
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Chap. 7), we believe that participants' explicit avowals of normative principles is not by itself 
a reliable source. This also becomes vivid in the presence of moral dumbfounding when it is 
investigated whether people can provide reasons and articulate moral principles matching 
their judgments and endorsed principles (McHugh, McGann, Igou, & Kinsella, 2018). 
Moreover, to avoid participants displaying one reflective attitude when presented with 
one pair of cases, and another when presented with a different pair with no attempt at 
integration, we seek to elicit commitments through the participants' own normative behavior. 
To do this, we introduce a novel scorekeeping task where we put participants in the position 
of judging how well their peers argued for their mutually incompatible responses and where 
we equip the participants with normative actions. The task of participants consists in applying 
sanctions and assigning burden of proofs to the one of their peers who has provided the 
weakest advocacy of his or her responses.  
We take the commitments the participants adopt in this argumentative setting as 
binding, in the sense that they can be used as a basis for attributing reasoning errors to the 
participants. This is based on the simple principle that it is always appropriate to hold a person 
responsible to the norms that he/she uses to criticize her peers with–itself a kind of 
consistency requirement. For example, Brandom (1994) has argued that agents can be held 
responsible to comply with norms only insofar as they express some sort of recognition of 
being bound by these norms. In particular, Brandom has emphasized that one implicit way of 
recognizing boundedness to a norm, which does not rely on explicitly avowing normative 
principles, consists in criticizing and sanctioning others based on violations of this norm. This 
thought then opens up a new avenue of psychological research into which norms the 
participants hold their peers accountable to in argumentative settings (Skovgaard-Olsen, 
2017). Moreover, it is very much in line with recent developments emphasizing that the 
evolutionary function of reasoning is argumentative: to devise and evaluate arguments 
intended for persuasion (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, 2017). 
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The experimental framework provided by the Scorekeeping Task is used as a means 
for probing into the participants’ own understanding of the task, their goals in completing it, 
and their understanding of the logical concepts involved in it. Throughout the task, the 
participants’ own reflective attitudes are elicited. This enables a comparison between the 
participants’ reflective attitudes and their case judgments to investigate their agreement and to 
initiate a search for covariates that characterize the participants who are classified into 
different profiles of reflective attitudes and case judgments. Finally, reasoning errors can be 
defined and studied as cases in which the participants fail to comply with the logical 
consequences of the norms they hold their peers accountable to.  
We next illustrate these various tools by putting them to use in a case study. 
 
Case Study: Norms and the Interpretation of Indicative Conditionals 
Research on conditionals appears in Elqayam and Evans’s (2011) critique as one of 
the areas in the psychology of reasoning that is plagued by the existence of multiple 
normative accounts and seemingly fallacious ‘is-to-ought’ inferences. Therefore, it constitutes 
an ideal case study for our individual profiling approach.  
Conditionals play a key role in reasoning and argumentation in general. For instance, 
when identifying the type of questions that are amenable to experimental research, Kirk 
(2013) notes in his book on experimental design that they "should be reducible to the form, if 
A, then B". But despite this prominence, the meaning of the natural language conditional is a 
matter of longstanding theoretical debate that is far from resolved, with many competing 
views (Nickerson, 2015). Our case study will contrast two of these views and seek to 
demonstrate tools for adjudicating between them. The non-specialist reader may simply take 
this fact at face value.  
The first of the two normative perspectives on conditional reasoning examined here is 
based on the work of Adams (1965), Edgington (1995a), and Bennett (2004). According to 
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this prominent view, the probability of an indicative conditional is evaluated by the Ramsey 
Test: 
RAMSEY TEST: to evaluate 'if A, then C' add the antecedent (i.e. A) to the 
background beliefs, make minimal adjustments to secure consistency, and evaluate the 
consequent (i.e. C) on the basis of this temporarily augmented background beliefs.  
Quantitatively, this introduces the following equivalence prediction:  
P(if A, then C) = P(C|A), 
which is referred to as the conditional-probability hypothesis.5 This equivalence implies the 
inequality 
P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A,C), 
as P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) holds by probability theory. 
Much of the recent work in psychology of reasoning has been strongly influenced by 
these views of the conditional (Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Baratgin, 
Over, and Politzer, 2013; Pfeifer, 2013), which we will here refer to as the Suppositional 
Theory of Conditionals (henceforth ST). Inspired by the conditional probability hypothesis 
and the Ramsey test, Evans and Over (2004) express the view that ‘if’ is a linguistic device 
for triggering a process of hypothetical or suppositional reasoning. In addition, Evans and 
Over (2004) embed ST within a dual-process framework that seeks to distinguish heuristic 
and analytic processes. But here we just take ST as denoting the theses above, which share a 
wider appeal. Indeed, in a recent introduction to conditionals in cognitive science, the 
conditional probability hypothesis is presented as "fundamental" to a new probabilistic 
paradigm in cognitive psychology (Nickerson, 2015, p.199), and in Oaksford and Chater 
(2017) it is said to be "at the heart of the probabilistic new paradigm in reasoning" (p. 330).   
                                                 
5  Variants of this hypothesis have been discussed under different names such as 
'Stalnaker Hypothesis', 'Adam's Thesis', and 'The Equation' in the literature (Oaksford and 
Chater, 2010; Douven, 2015). 
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The Ramsey Test was a direct source of inspiration for several further theories in 
belief revision and conditional logics (Arlo-Costa, 2007). For theories inspired by the Ramsey 
test, the ⊤⊤ cell of truth tables, where both the antecedent and the consequent take the value 
'True', functions as a trivial instance in which the conditional is true. Testing whether the 
consequent is true under the supposition that the antecedent is true reduces to testing whether 
the consequent is true, whenever the antecedent is already known to be true. Accordingly, 
inferences from conjunctions (‘A and C’) to conditionals (‘If A, then C’), the so-called and-
to-if inferences, are valid for theories of conditionals based on the Ramsey test.  
An example of an and-to-if inference is inferring ‘if Craig pays for the dinner, then 
Matthew will invite Craig out to the movies’ from observing ‘Craig paying for the dinner and 
Matthew inviting Craig out to the movies’. As Edgington (1995b) points out, we may not 
have much need to infer a conditional if we already know that the conjunction is true. But this 
does not mean that we are permitted to consider the conditional false, either. Indeed, 
Edgington argues that someone rejecting the conditional, ‘if Craig pays for the dinner, then 
Matthew will invite Craig out to the movies’, would have to admit that they were wrong, if it 
turned out to be true that Craig pays for the dinner and Matthew invites Craig out to the 
movies. According to ST, the participants are predicted to conform to the following inequality 
in the so-called uncertain and-to-if inference, where they are presented with ‘A and C’ as a 
premise and ‘if A, then C’ as a conclusion and asked to assign probabilities to each: 
P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) 
This prediction was directly tested by Cruz et al. (2015), who found that participants 
conformed to this inequality at above-chance levels.6 
                                                 
6  In the Online Supplementary Materials, we discuss how prediction-performance levels 
from the different accounts can be compared to chance in the Bayesian mixture model used in 
our analyses. This chance correction is very similar to the one adopted by Cruz et al. (2015) 
and Evans et al. (2015).  
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 However, not all agree that P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) applies universally to all 
sentences with the syntactic form of a conditional. As pointed out by Edgington (1995a), one 
common objection is that the conditional probability hypothesis does not apply to conditionals 
containing sentences that are mutually irrelevant like ‘If Napoleon is dead, Oxford is in 
England’. These conditionals, which have come to be known as missing-link conditionals, 
represent an explanatory challenge for ST (Douven, 2017). 
 According to a rivaling approach known as inferentialism, the oddness of missing-link 
conditionals is interpreted as indicating that conditionals express reason relations or 
condensed arguments (Ryle, 1950; Rott, 1986; Strawson, 1986; Brandom, 1994; Read, 1995; 
Rescher, 2007; Spohn, 2013; Olsen, 2014; Douven, 2015; Krzyżanowska, 2015; Skovgaard-
Olsen, 2016b). Proponents of inferentialism are also inclined to point out that inferences from 
and-to-if become a lot less plausible once missing-link conditionals are considered. Suppose 
we learn some irrelevant fact about Craig in the example above, which is unknown to 
Matthew. Say, Craig’s grandmother has a dog. And suppose further that it is still the case that 
Matthew invites Craig out to the movies. In that case, the conditional ‘If Craig’s grandmother 
has a dog, then Matthew will invite Craig out to the movies’ sounds bizarre to someone who 
tends to view the conditional as expressing a reason relation, although we know that the 
conjunction happens to be true.  With the introduction of inferentialism to the psychology of 
reasoning, there is currently a considerable interest in and-to-if inferences. According to Over 
and Cruz (2018), these inferences represent "an important high-level dividing line between 
theories of conditionals". In Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, and Klauer (2016) a probabilistic 
implementation of inferentialism was given as a descriptive thesis, which employs the 
following explication of the reason relation, following Spohn (2012, Chap. 6): 
A is positively relevant for C (and a reason for C) iff ΔP > 0  
A is negatively relevant for C (and a reason against C) iff ΔP < 0 
 A is irrelevant for C iff ΔP = 0 
16 
 
 For ΔP = P(C|A) - P(C|¬A) 
The underlying intuition is that what we mean when we say that A is a reason for C is that A 
raises the probability of C. When we assume that A is the case, C becomes more likely as 
compared to when we assume that A is not the case. In the case of irrelevance, we can either 
assume A or ¬A, and the probability of C will stay the same, because A makes no difference 
for our degree of belief in C. The theory here follows Spohn’s (1991, 2012) explication of the 
reason relation in terms of probability difference making, which treats causality as a special 
case of the generic reason relation. In Hahn and Oaksford (2007) similar ideas were applied to 
analysing informal arguments. Moreover, in the psychological literature on causation, ΔP > 0 
has likewise been taken to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for judging causality. 
Or rather: the causal power, WC, is a scaled version of ΔP (Cheng, 1997): 
𝑊𝐶 = ∆𝑃1−𝑃(𝐸|¬𝐶)   for E = effect, C = cause   
Theories emphasizing causal interpretations of indicative conditionals, like Ali et al. (2010) 
and van Rooji & Schulz (2018), could be cast as special cases of an inferentialist approach to 
conditionals. The inferentialist approach is more general, however, because it applies equally 
well to diagnostic inferences from effects to causes, correlations in common cause scenarios, 
context-specific correlations in the absence of stable causal relations, and non-causal 
deductive inferences. Skovgaard-Olsen (2016a) moreover established a connection between 
the inferentialist view and Rescorla and Wagner's work on classical conditioning. Skovgaard-
Olsen argued that one of the central functions of indicative conditionals is to culturally 
transmit information about contingency relationships, which would otherwise have to be 
tediously acquired by each subject on their own through associative learning.  
 The probabilistic implementation of inferentialism established by Skovgaard-Olsen et 
al. (2016) is a descriptive thesis named the Default and Penalty Hypothesis (DP). DP posits 
that participants have the goal of evaluating whether a sufficient reason relation obtains when 
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evaluating P(if A, then C). According to the above explication of the reason relation, this 
requires at least two things: (a) assessing whether A is positively relevant for C, and (b) 
assessing the sufficiency of A as a reason for C by means of P(C|A). Moreover, DP postulates 
that participants make the default assumption that (a) is satisfied, which reduces their task of 
assessing P(if A, then C) to an assessment of P(C|A). However, when participants are 
negatively surprised by a violation of this default assumption, such as when they are presented 
with stimulus materials implementing the negative relevance (ΔP < 0) or irrelevance category 
(ΔP = 0), they apply a penalty to their estimate of P(if A, then C) as a way of reacting to the 
conditional’s failure to express that A is a reason for C. An example would be the conditional 
‘If Oxford is in England, then Napoleon is dead’, which sounds defective to the extent that the 
antecedent is obviously irrelevant for the consequent, as noted above. 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016) reported empirical evidence in support of DP, showing 
that P(if A, then C) = P(C|A) only holds when A is positively relevant for C in virtue of 
raising its probability. When A is negatively relevant by lowering C’s probability, and when 
A is irrelevant for C by leaving its probability unchanged, violations of the conditional 
probability hypothesis occurred. These findings were replicated by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2017b), who observed an average estimate of P(if A, then C) of .38, along with P(C|A) = 1.  
Moreover, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a) found that Cruz et al.’s (2015) finding of an above-
chance conformity to the inequality P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) in the uncertain and-to-if 
inference task only holds for positive relevance. In negative relevance and irrelevance 
conditions, participants actually perform at below-chance levels. For instance in the 
irrelevance condition it was found that participants conformed to the inequality in only 54% 
of the cases, a considerable drop from the 87% observed in the positive relevance condition. 
Importantly, this drop in conformity to the and-to-if inference across relevance levels was not 
reflected in participants’ conformity to the inequality P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C): 77% and 76% in the 
positive relevance and irrelevance conditions, respectively. It is not clear how the dissociation 
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between the effect of relevance on the P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) and P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) can 
be reconciled under ST’s assumption that P(if A, then C) = P(C|A). 
 Given the theoretical status of the inequality P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise), it is critical 
that we understand the nature of the lack conformity to it under certain relevance conditions. 
One possibility is that individuals are adhering to ST but just so happen to be committing 
reasoning errors. Alternatively, it is possible that individuals are in fact adhering to an 
alternative interpretation of conditionals like DP, under which their responses are not only 
justified but expected. Unfortunately, this interpretational ambiguity cannot be resolved with 
the currently available studies, as they only enable an evaluation at the aggregate-group level. 
Ultimately, we want to be able to establish individual profiles that characterize each 
participant’s reflective attitudes, and use them to evaluate the correctness of their judgments. 
In order to achieve this goal, we developed a novel experimental paradigm, the Scorekeeping 
Task, along with a Bayesian mixture model that was tailored to characterize the data coming 
from it.7  
Experiments 
 The scorekeeping task is implemented in three different studies, and used to establish 
individual profiles according to their classification as followers of the Suppositional Theory 
(ST) or the Default and Penalty Hypothesis (DP). These profiles were then used to investigate 
whether participants are committing reasoning errors, relative to their own interpretation of 
the conditional. In Experiments 1 and 2, we focused on the uncertain and-to-if inference task, 
whereas Experiment 3 focused on the acceptance of entailment relations. Additionally, we 
tested whether individuals classified as adhering to ST and DP differed with respect to their 
interpretation of probabilities (Experiment 1), production of conjunction fallacies (Experiment 
1), or argumentative skills (Experiment 2). 
                                                 
7  For a detailed discussion of how the Bayesian mixture model differs from previous 
regression-based approaches, see Online Supplementary Materials. 
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Experiments 1 and 2 
The goal of the first two experiments is to use the participants’ responses in the 
Scorekeeping Task in order to establish individual profiles of the participants based on 
whether they can be classified as following the Suppositional theory (ST) or the Default and 
Penalty Hypothesis (DP). But due to their similarity, both experiments are reported together. 
However, it should be highlighted that one of the main motivations of Experiment 2 was to 
replicate some of the results from Experiment 1. The key differences between the two 
experiments concern the use of novel scenarios in Phase 4 (instead of the same scenarios from 
Phase 1), and the type of individual judgments being evaluated in Phase 4 (Experiment 1: 
conjunction fallacy and interpretation of probabilities; Experiment 2: argumentation skills). 
Given the similarity of the main results obtained with Experiment 2, we will only present the 
figures for results from Experiment 1 (for the results of phase 4 of both experiments, and the 
results of Experiment 2, see Online Supplementary Materials). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants from the USA, UK, Canada, and Australia took part in these experiments, 
which were launched over the Internet (via Mechanical Turk) to obtain a large and 
demographically diverse sample. 354 persons took part in the first Experiment, 552 in the 
second.   
Participants were paid a small amount of money for their participation. The following 
exclusion criteria were used: not having English as native language, completing the 
experiment in less than 300 seconds, failing to answer two simple SAT comprehension 
questions correctly in a warm-up phase, and answering ‘not serious at all’ to the question how 
serious they would take their participation at the beginning of the study. The final samples 
consisted of 261 and 340 participants, respectively. In Experiment 1, the mean age was 36.53 
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years, ranging from 20 to 75, 66% were female, 66% indicated that the highest level of 
education that they had completed was an undergraduate degree or higher. The demographic 
measures of the participants differed only minimally before and after the exclusion. The 
demographic variables in Experiment 2 were very similar. 
Design 
The experiments implemented a within-subject design with two factors varied within 
participants: relevance (with two levels: positive relevance, irrelevance) and priors (with four 
levels: HH, HL, LH, LL, meaning, for example, that P(A) = low and P(C) = high for LH). 
Materials and Procedure 
We used a slightly modified version of 12 of the different scenarios presented in 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016) (see Supplementary Materials). They have been pretested to 
manipulate the reason relations defined above. This allows us to vary the presence and 
absence of specific reason relation orthogonally to other psychological factors of interest. To 
illustrate, Table 1 displays target positive relevance and irrelevance conditionals for the Scott 
scenario: 
Table 1. Stimulus Materials, Scott Scenario 
Scenario Scott was just out playing with his friends in the snow. He has now gone inside but is still freezing 
and takes a bath. As both he and his clothes are very dirty, he is likely to make a mess in the process, 
which he knows his mother dislikes 
 Positive Relevance Irrelevance 
HH If Scott turns on the warm water, then he will 
be warm soon 
If Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as him, 
then Scott will turn on the warm water. 
HL If Scott makes an effort to be tidy, then the 
bathroom will be just as clean as before he 
took his bath. 
If Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as him, 
then Scott will turn on the cold water. 
 
LH If Scott bathes in a hot spring, then he will be 
warm soon. 
If Scott’s friends are 10 years older than him, then 
Scott will turn on the hot water. 
LL If Scott turns on the cold water, then he will 
soon start to freeze even more. 
If Scott’s friends are 10 years older than him, then 
Scott will turn on the cold water. 
Positive Relevance (PO):              
Irrelevance (IR):                            
 
mean ΔP     =  .32                                   
mean ΔP     = -.01 
                              
High antecedent:       
Low antecedent:        
High consequent: 
Low consequent:                                 
mean P(A)  =  .70 
mean P(A)  =  .15 
mean P(C)  =  .77 
mean P(C) =  .27 
Note. HL: P(A) = High, P(C) = low; LH: P(A) = low, P(C) = high. The bottom rows display the mean values for 
all 12 scenarios pretested with 725 participants in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a). 
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For each scenario we had 8 conditions according to our design (i.e., 4 conditions for 
positive relevance [i.e., HH, HL, LH, LL], 4 conditions for irrelevance). Each participant 
worked on one randomly selected (without replacement) scenario for each of the 8 within-
subjects conditions such that each participant saw a different scenario for each condition.  
Experiments were split into four phases. The precise formulation of all the questions 
and instructions can be found in the Supplementary Materials. Here we focus on conveying 
the conceptual ideas. 
Phase 1: Case Judgments. 
The first phase contained eight blocks, one for each within-subjects condition. The 
order of the blocks was randomized anew for each participant and there were no breaks 
between the blocks. Within each block, the participants were presented with four pages. On 
the first page, the participants were shown a scenario text like the above Scott scenario. 
To introduce the eight within-subjects conditions for the scenario above we, inter alia, 
exploited the fact that the participants assume that Scott’s turning on the warm water raises 
the probability of Scott being warm soon. In the terms introduced above, Scott’s turning on 
the warm water is in other words positively relevant for (or a reason for) believing that Scott 
will be warm soon (positive relevance). In contrast, Scott’s friends being roughly the same 
age as Scott is irrelevant for whether Scott will turn on the warm water (irrelevance). The first 
sentence in other words leaves the probability of the second sentence unchanged, as verified 
in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a). In this study, we use such irrelevance items to present the 
participants with missing-link conditionals.  
The scenario text was repeated on each of the following three pages which measured 
P(A and C), P(C|A), and P(if A, then C) in random order. Throughout the experiment, 
participants gave their probability assignments using sliders with values between 0 and 100%. 
To measure P(C|A), the participants might thus be presented with the following question in an 
irrelevance condition: 
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Suppose Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as Scott. 
Under this assumption, how probable is it that the following sentence is 
true on a scale from 0 to 100%: 
Scott will turn on the warm water. 
Phase 2: The Scorekeeping Task.  
In this phase the participants were first presented with a new irrelevance item to be 
rated in the same way as the items in phase 1. The missing-link conditional took the following 
form and it was evaluated in the context of a dating scenario describing Stephen’s 
preparations for a date with Sara: ‘If Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his 
cornflakes, then Stephen will wear some of his best clothes on the date’. Then the participants 
were presented with the following instruction:  
When given the task you just completed, John and Robert responded very 
differently to some of the scenarios as outlined below.   
And it was explained that John and Robert responded in the following way to the “if-then 
sentence” and the “suppose-sentence” (where the “suppose-sentence” had been identified for 
the participants as the type of question quoted above for measuring P(C|A)):  
John assigned 99% to the suppose-sentence and 1% to the if_then sentence. 
Robert assigned 90% to the suppose-sentence and 90% to the if_then sentence.  
In order to reduce the processing demands of this task, these values were repeated on each of 
the following four pages along with the irrelevance item. Note that although John and Robert 
are fictive participants, these values were based on actual data provided by other participants 
in response to the irrelevance item in previous studies.  
As part of the Scorekeeping Task, the participants were instructed to apply a sanction 
to John or Robert’s response based on its adequacy. Given their large divergence, the 
participants were instructed that at most one of John or Robert’s responses could be approved 
as adequate. Since the experiment was run on Mechanical Turk we exploited the fact that an 
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ecologically valid sanction for the participants would be not to have a task (called a “HIT”) 
approved. Because the approval of HITs on Mechanical Turk determines whether the 
participants are paid for a completed task (and moreover counts towards their reputation, 
which determines whether they can participate in future HITs), it is our experience that the 
participants on Mechanical Turk care a lot about the approval of their HITs. We therefore 
expected that applying the sanction of not approving either John or Robert’s HIT based on its 
adequacy would be a contextually salient sanction, which the participants would be highly 
motivated to reason about. 
Next the participants were asked to state the reasons that they could think of which 
could be given for or against John and Robert’s responses in an open entry question, included 
for exploratory purposes.  
On the two pages that followed, the participants were presented with John’s criticism 
of Robert and Robert’s criticism of John in random order. Robert made the following 
complaint about John’s response: 
Robert's no difference justification: “There is no difference between the 
two questions. So why do you give a lower probability to:  
'IF Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his cornflakes, THEN 
Stephen will wear some of his best clothes on the date’  
than you gave to:  
'Stephen will wear some of his best clothes on the date' under the 
assumption that 'Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his 
cornflakes'? 
This makes no sense!” 
John in turn made the following complaint about Robert’s response:  
John's irrelevance justification: “Whether 'Stephen’s neighbour prefers 
to put milk on his cornflakes' or not is irrelevant for whether 'Stephen will 
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wear some of his best clothes on the date'. So why do you give such a high 
probability to: ‘IF Stephen’s neighbour prefers to put milk on his 
cornflakes, THEN Stephen will wear some of his best clothes on the date'? 
This makes no sense!” 
In each case, the participants were asked to indicate using a binary ‘yes/no’ answer whether 
they agreed with the statements: 
- John’s irrelevance justification [/Robert’s no difference justification] 
shows that Robert's [/John’s] response is wrong. 
- Robert [/John] needs to come up with a very good response to John's 
[/Robert’s] criticism, if his HIT is to be approved.  
Finally, after having seen the justifications from both sides, the participants were asked which 
justification they found most convincing by choosing between the following options presented 
in random order:  
The two justifications are equally convincing 
John’s irrelevance justification 
Robert’s no difference justification 
Moreover, the participants were asked to indicate whose HIT deserves to be approved based 
on their justifications by selecting one of the following options presented in random order: 
None of their HITs should be approved 
Robert’s HIT should be approved 
John’s HIT should be approved 
Phase 3: The Uncertain And-to-If Inference. 
This phase served the purpose of testing the participants’ performance on the uncertain 
and-to-if inference task under relevance manipulations. Phase 3 was used to measure whether 
participants' responses to the uncertain and-to-if inference task were consistent with the 
interpretation of the conditional they had been classified according to. 
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Phase 3 contained 8 blocks implementing the same within-subjects conditions as phase 
1. In Experiment 1, for each participant, the same permutations of scenarios and within-
subject conditions that had been randomly generated in phase 1 were displayed again in 
random order. In Experiment 2, new scenarios were used. First the participants were 
instructed that they would be presented with short arguments based on the scenario texts. 
They were told that the premise and the conclusion of the arguments could be uncertain and 
that it was their task to evaluate their probabilities. On the top of the page the scenario text 
was placed as a reminder. Below the participants were instructed to read an argument 
containing the conjunction as a premise and the conditional as a conclusion, employing 
sentences that they assigned probabilities to in phase 1. Furthermore, the actual value of the 
probability that they had assigned to the premise in phase 1 was displayed to the participants 
in a salient blue color. We here illustrate it using the example above from phase 1 of a 
positive relevance item: 
Premise: Scott turns on the warm water AND Scott will be warm soon 
Conclusion: IF Scott’s turns on the warm water, THEN Scott will be 
warm soon 
You have estimated the probability of the premise as: 90% 
Please rate the probability of the statement in the conclusion on a scale 
from 0 to 100%.  
Phase 4: Individual Variation. 
In the Online Supplementary Materials, further investigations are reported into 
covariates that would characterize participants classified as interpreting the conditional 
according to ST and DP such as differences in their argumentative skills (evaluated by an 
adaption of Kuhn’s (1991) task), their interpretation of probabilities, and tendency to commit 
the conjunction fallacy. The goal of these investigations was to consider the hypotheses that 
1) what characterizes DP participants is merely a defective understanding of probabilities, and 
26 
 
2) participants in the DP group pay more attention to reason relations because they possess 
stronger argumentative skills than ST participants. The first of these is introduced as an 
alternative hypothesis in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a), and it echoes results by Tentori, 
Crupi, and Russo (2013), who found that the participants committing the conjunction fallacy 
are misled by the degree of confirmation of the added conjunct. However, neither hypothesis 
could be supported by our results; it therefore appears that the differences we tap into when 
investigating the opposition between ST and DP are orthogonal to differences in these further 
variables.   
 
Results and Discussion 
Bayesian Mixture Model 
In order to investigate the participants’ interpretation of the conditional, the probability 
judgments produced in phase 1 were classified as coming from one of two latent classes using 
a Bayesian Mixture Model (see Online Supplementary Materials). When individuals follow 
ST, the generated P(if A, then C) are expected to follow P(C|A) in both the positive relevance 
and irrelevance conditions. In contrast, when individuals follow DP, the generated P(if A, 
then C) are expected to follow P(C|A) in the positive relevance condition, and a penalized 
version of P(C|A) in the irrelevance condition (each participant i has a penalty parameter, θ):  
𝑃(𝑖𝑖 𝐴, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐶)𝑖,𝑗 =  �𝑃(𝐶| 𝐴)𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,                𝑤𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 0,𝜃𝑖𝑃(𝐶| 𝐴)𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,             𝑤𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 1, 
Figure 1 displays the predictions of these two models for the irrelevance condition. Note that 
when θ = 1, the ST and DP models coincide, although the implied predictions are not really in 
accordance with the gist of DP. However, this point turns out not to be of practical import, 
because since ST is more parsimonious it will be preferred when θ = 1 (see M. D. Lee, 2016). 
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Figure 1. Predictions. The Suppositional Theory (ST) equates P(if A then C) and 
P(C|A). The Default-Penalty Hypothesis (DP) makes the same prediction only 
for positive relevance (PO). For irrelevance (IR), it expects a function that lies 
below the diagonal. Here we assume for our classificatory purposes that the DP 
predictions in IR correspond to a linear function with a slope between 0 and 1.   
In the positive relevance condition, where ST and DP coincide, classifications were 
made using two classes: One that expects the elicited P(if A, then C) to be equivalent to the 
elicited P(C|A), as expected by both ST and DP, and a second “saturated” class which 
establishes one parameter per data point: 
𝑃(𝑖𝑖 𝐴, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐶)𝑖,𝑗 =  �    𝑃(𝐶| 𝐴)𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗 ,           𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 0, 1,𝛽𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,                       𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 2,  
This second class is used here to exclude individuals whose responses are not in line 
with either ST or DP. This exclusion constitutes an important step here as we first need to 
ensure that both models at the very least are able to provide a good account of the data in 
which they agree, and thus to avoid potential distortions that could be introduced by including 
data that is at odds with both theoretical accounts (Hilbig & Moshagen, 2014). This focus on a 
subset of the data establishes an “optimistic testbed” for the two different theoretical accounts 
in the sense that the testing of predictions is limited to data that both theories can successfully 
describe.  
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Phase 1. The individual-level classifications shown in Figure 2 show that the probabilities 
generated by the majority of individuals in the positive relevance condition were in line with 
ST/DP (211 out of 261). In contrast, it could be seen based on the irrelevance condition that 
only a very small group of individuals were in line with ST (52 out of 225), as the vast 
majority of them followed the predictions of DP (159). The individual data from Experiment 
1 shown in the left and central panels of Figure 2 show that the data classified as ST/DP in the 
positive relevance condition (upper panels) as well as ST and DP in the irrelevance condition 
(bottom panels) were in line with the model predictions. These results were corroborated by 
the classification probabilities, as most classifications were far from the cut-off .50 value. 
There were relatively few classifications that were close to .50 (see Figure 2). Additional 
support comes from the 𝜃𝑖 estimates obtained when individuals were classified as following 
DP. In both experiments, these values were far from the upper boundary of 1, where no 
penalty is imposed and DP converges to ST (Mean = 0.31, SD = 0.24), indicating that the 
small number of ST adherents is not due to any sort of mimicry from DP. 
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Figure 2. Left and Center Panels: Individual data associated to the phase 1 classifications in 
Experiment 1. Right Panels: Individuals’ posterior classifications (note that in the irrelevance 
condition, only participants classified as ST/DP in the positive relevance condition were 
considered). 
 
Phase 2. Next we classified the participants based on the reflective attitudes the participants’ 
manifested through their behavior on the scorekeeping task. This task was used to commit the 
participants to an interpretation of the conditional, depending on whether they agreed to 
criticize John or Robert and sanction them through HIT assignments. If the participants were 
following the instrumental goal of engaging in suppositional reasoning when assessing the 
conditional, then they should treat the conditional as expressing a conditional probability and 
agree with Robert. If the participants were following the instrumental goal of assessing 
whether a sufficient reason relation obtained, then the irrelevance condition should make the 
conditionals appear defective and they should agree with John.  
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In this classification we considered 1) their support for one of the fictive characters 
and 2) their HIT attribution. Individuals were classified as DP/ST when they judged the 
fictive character of DP/ST to be most convincing and attributed him the HIT.  
Table 2. Phase 1 and Phase 2 comparison (Experiment 1) 
Phase 1 ST1 (N = 52) DP1  (N = 159) Unclassified (N = 50) 
Accept Criticism .67 [,.53, .81] .85 [.79, .91] .59 [.43, .74] / .50 [.34, .66] 
Assign Burden of Proof .80 [.72,  .86] .71 [.57, .84] .49 [.34, .66] / .55 [.39, .70] 
Most Convincing* .96 [.86, 1] .97 [.92, 1] .35 [.14, .60] 
Approve Hit* .92 [.80, .99] .92 [.86, .97] .62 [.44, .78] 
Phase 1 / Phase 2 ST2 (N = 46) DP2  (N = 132) Unclassified (N = 83) 
ST1 (N = 52) 32 0 20 
DP1  (N = 159) 1 125 33 
Unclassified  (N = 50) 13 7 30 
Note. The top rows show the posterior probabilities of ST1 and DP1 participants, following their assigned 
interpretation for each phase 2 question. In the column ‘Unclassified’, we report two estimates, 
corresponding to the subjects that would have been classified as ST/DP in the irrelevance condition 
(left/right). Rows ‘Most Convincing’ and ‘Approve HIT’ indicate the posterior probability that consistent 
preference was expressed; conditional on the presence of a preference (e.g., subject did not express 
indifference). The phase 2 classification in the bottom row is based on the participants’ responses to who 
had the most convincing justification, and whose HIT should be approved, after having seen the 
justification from both sides.  
As shown in Table 2, the match between the phase 1 and 2 classifications is large and 
systematically above .50. Unclassified participants distributed their responses roughly equally 
across Robert and John. Although the overlap between phase-1 and phase-2 classifications 
was considerable (157 participants out of 211), it was not perfect. This was mainly due to the 
circumstance that there was a substantial proportion of the participants (73), who found the 
two fictive characters equally convincing and a few participants (21), who chose to assign a 
HIT to neither. But for those who did, their judgments were closely aligned with their phase 1 
classification. 
 
Phase 3. We now turn to the participants’ conformity to the two inequalities associated with 
uncertain and-to-if inferences:  
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P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) 
P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) 
Figure 3 depicts the posterior distributions of these deviations from chance on an effect-size 
scale, with positive values indicating an above-chance conformity to the inequalities (for 
details, see Online Supplementary Materials): In the positive relevance condition (left panel), 
the participants conformed to both inequalities at above-chance levels. This result is 
represented by the posterior distributions placed with virtually all of their mass above zero 
(i.e., BP ≈ 0). This pattern of results held for both individuals classified as adhering to ST and 
DP. However, the posterior distributions for ST are more dispersed due to the small number 
of participants classified as such. Differences were found in the irrelevance condition, since 
individuals classified as following ST conformed to both inequalities at above-chance rates, 
 
Figure 3. Posterior distributions of the deviations of the tested inequalities from chance-level occurrence 
(represented on an effect-size scale) in Experiment 1. The vertical lines indicate effect size 0 and BP 
corresponds to the probability of samples from the posterior distributions taking on values below 0. In the 
left panels we depict the posterior distributions for participants classified as ST and DP (the latter 
corresponding to the more peaked distributions) in the positive relevance condition. 
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whereas individuals classified as following DP followed P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) at 
below-chance rates. This difference is germane given that P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) is not 
expected to hold under DP when there is no positive reason relation between the antecedent 
and the consequent. Note that P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) is expected to hold across accounts and 
relevance conditions; this prediction also held empirically.  
 
Experiment 3 
So far we have been concerned with interpretations of the conditionals that the 
participants commit to when making probabilistic assessments. This evaluation can be 
extended to other types of judgments, such as the acceptance of entailments. A central 
empirical adequacy criterion of semantic theories in general is that they respect intuitive 
entailment judgments (Winter, 2016). Indeed, such judgments make up one of the primary 
sources of data for semantic theories. The goal of Experiment 3 is to investigate how robust 
and stable the participants' interpretations of conditionals under different task constraints are. 
As previously discussed, individuals following ST are expected to infer a conditional 
‘If A, then C’ when using the conjunction ‘A and C’ as a premise. In other words, they are 
expected to produce and-to-if inferences. No such expectation holds for individuals reasoning 
according to DP, at least in the absence of a reason relation between A and C. In the context 
of Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that individuals’ classification in the Scorekeeping Task 
as ST or DP was consistent with whether or not they conformed to the inequality P(if A, then 
C) ≥ P(A and C) in the uncertain-and-to-if task. This differential conformity has implications 
for the acceptance of entailments. For instance, it would be inconsistent for reasoners 
adhering to DP to violate the inequality P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A and C) in the uncertain-and-to-
if task while accepting that the conditional ‘if A, then C’ is entailed by the premise ‘A and C’. 
This consistency requirement follows from general constraints that ensure that probabilistic 
reasoning is consistent with deductive logic (Joyce, 2004; Oaksford, 2014):  
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       A ⊨ B  only if  P(B) ≥ P(A) 
 Hence,  
  A and C ⊨ if A, then C  only if  P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A and C) 
In order to evaluate conformity to this consistency requirement, Experiment 3 is 
comprised of two sessions: The first session is essentially a replication of Experiment 1 that 
allows us to classify individuals as adhering to ST or DP with the Scorekeeping Task.  
In the second session, individuals were presented with different scenarios in which 
two speakers disagreed on whether a certain conclusion followed from a given premise. We 
considered three types of inferences under positive relevance and irrelevance conditions: 
First, the aforementioned and-to-if inference, that one is expected to follow depending on the 
interpretation of the conditional adhered to: 
A and C ⊨ if A, then C. 
Specifically, we expect individuals conforming to ST to accept that ‘if A, then C’ is 
entailed by ‘A and C’, whereas no such acceptance is expected for individuals adhering to DP 
across relevance conditions. We also considered two other inferences, namely and-to-A 
inferences, which are uncontroversially valid, 
A and C ⊨ A, 
and A-to-and inferences, which are uncontroversially  invalid8 
A ⊨ A and C. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Experiment 3 was run over Mechanical Turk and used the same exclusion criteria as 
Experiment 1. A total of 811 people participated in the first session 1. Of these a total of 610 
                                                 
8  We refer to the validity status of these two inferences as uncontroversial given that we 
do not know of any logical system in which they are assigned a different status. 
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participated in session 2, which was run approximately 10 days later. In addition to the 
exclusion criteria from Experiment 1, we checked their identity in session 2 by requiring them 
to provide once again some personal information (e.g., first letter of your favorite color, first 
letter of mother’s name) to generate codes like 'AS6G1P', which preserved the anonymity of 
the participants. In the end, we were left with a final sample of 552 participants, with similar 
demographic characteristics as in Experiment 1 and 2. Of these, 515 could be classified as 
following either DP or ST in the Scorekeeping Task. In the analysis below, we focus on these 
515 participants (330 DP; 186 ST). 
Design 
The first session of Experiment 3 had the same design as Experiment 1, with 
additional questions for prior probabilities. However, in contrast with Experiment 1, the 
participants were now presented with the Scorekeeping Task as a two-alternative forced-
choice task, where they either had to take sides with one of the two fictive characters (i.e., 
they cannot deem them equally convincing). The second session presented the same eight 
within-subject conditions as Experiment 1. In addition to the entailment judgments, we also 
collected the participants’ self-reported consistency in session 2 with their judgments in 
session 1. 
Materials and Procedure 
 For the entailment judgments in session 2, the participants were given the following 
instructions: 
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In the following you are going to see a short conversation, where Louis 
accuses Samuel of saying two things that cannot both be true. Whether you agree with 
Samuel's assertions is beside the point. What we are interested in is just the extent to 
which you agree with Louis that Samuel is saying two things that cannot both be true. 
When you read the sentences please pay attention to small differences in their content, 
so that we don't unfairly accuse Samuel of making a mistake.  
After a few practice items, the participants were presented with the same randomly selected 
scenarios as in Experiment 1, and on the three pages that followed, Samuel would assert the 
premise of each of the three types of inferences described above and deny its conclusion. 
Consider the following example, using the Scott scenario in Table 1 and one of the 
irrelevance items: 
Samuel:  Scott’s friends are roughly the same age as him AND Scott will turn on the 
warm water. 
 ... but it would be wrong to think that IF Scott’s friends are roughly the same 
age as him, THEN Scott will turn on the warm water. 
To which his interlocutor replied: 
Louis:   Wait, you've now said two things that can't both be true. 
The task of the participants was to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 
Louis' statement on a five-point Likert scale with levels strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, 
agree, and strongly agree. Agreeing with Louis in that Samuel had said two things that cannot 
both be true counts as accepting the corresponding entailment.  
  
Results 
Entailment Judgments. The design had replicates for each participant and item. It could 
therefore not be assumed that the data were independently and identically distributed. 
Consequently, linear mixed-effects models were used, with crossed random effects for 
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intercepts and slopes by participants and by scenarios (Baayen, Davidson, and Bates, 2008). 
This analysis was conducted using the statistical programming language R (R Core Team, 
2013), and the package brms for mixed-effects models in Bayesian statistics (Bürkner, 
2017). In order to examine the rating of entailments for the three types of inferences, we 
relied on the following models: 
• Model M1 modelled the rating as a function of factor ‘inference’ (coding the three 
different types of inferences), factor ‘relevance’, the factor ‘individual classification’ 
(as ST, DP, based on the Scorekeeping Task), and their interactions. 
• Model M2 builds upon M1 but without the ‘individual classification’ factor and its 
interactions. 
• Finally, model M3 builds upon M2 but without the ‘relevance’ factor and its 
interactions. 
In line with the previous studies, these models were implemented in a Bayesian framework 
with weakly informative priors, using the R package brms (Bürkner, 2017). Since the 
responses obtained from the five-point Likert scale are ordinal responses, the responses were 
modelled as generated by thresholds set on a latent continuous scale with a cumulative 
likelihood function and a logit link function (Bürkner & Vuorre, 2018). The upper part of 
Table 5 reports the performance of the models as quantified by the leave-one-out cross 
validation criterion and WAIC. 
           Table 5. Model Comparison  
 LOOIC ΔLOOIC SE WAIC Weight 
M1 30307.93 10.04 2.15 30276.2 0.006 
M2 30302.11 4.22 0.89 30270.3 0.108 
M3 30297.89 0 -- 30266.6 0.886 
M4 4968.35 4.52 5.22 4964.8 0.095 
M5 4963.84 0 -- 4960.5 0.905 
M6 5118.24 154.41 28.30 5113.7 0.000 
 
 
 Note. LOOIC = leave-one-out cross-validation information criterion. WAIC = Watanabe-Akaike 
information criterion. Weight = Akaike weight of LOO. 
 
 
 
As the information criteria indicate, M3 was the winning model within this first cluster of 
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models. This indicates that overall, the entailments the participants accept do not appear to be 
based on the relevance condition of the items, nor on which interpretation of the conditional 
the participants committed to in session 1. We thus find Bayes factors in the range of [19, 51] 
in favour of H0 when setting coefficients involving the relevance factor in M1 equal to 0. For 
instance, bPositiveRelevance:ANDIF:ST = 0.12, 95%-CI [-0.33, 0.57], BFH0H1 = 19.47 and bPositiveRelevance =         
-0.04, 95%-CI [-0.22, 0.14], BFH0H1 = 50.64. Furthermore, we find Bayes factors in the range of 
[6, 31] in favour of H0 when setting coefficients involving the individual classification factor 
in M1 equal to 0. 
 Examining the posterior predictive distribution of the winning model M3 illustrated in 
Figure 4, it is clear that most of the participants accept the valid and-to-A inferences, and that 
most reject the and-to-if inferences to the similar degree to which they reject the invalid A-to-
and inferences. 
  Figure 4. Predictions for Sampling from the Posterior Distribution of M3 
 
Note: The plot shows the relative proportions of the posterior predictions of the 
winning model (M3). ANDA = and-to-A inference, ANDIF = and-to-if inference, 
AAND = A-to-and inference. 
 
 
And-to-if inference. Given that the phase 2 classification does not predict the participants’ 
acceptance of entailments, we turned our focus to the participants' acceptance of and-to-if 
inferences (i.e., ratings larger than 3) and investigate whether it can be predicted by their 
acceptance of the invalid A-to-and inference and the valid and-to-A inference. Finally, we 
also considered the degree to which the participants view themselves in session 2 as being 
consistent with their judgments in session 1, ca. 10 days earlier. For the participants' own 
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perceived consistency, a factor was formed based on the quantiles low (≤ 40%), middle (41-
61%), high (≥ 62%): 
• Model M4 described the probability of accepting the and-to-if entailment as a function 
of the acceptance of the and-to-A inference, the A-to-and inference, the participant’s 
self-reported degree of consistency, and their respective interactions. 
• M5 builds on M4 but does not include the acceptance of the and-to-A inference factor. 
• M6 builds on M5 but does not include acceptance of the A-to-and inference factor. 
Since acceptance of an entailment is a binary variable, a binominal likelihood function was 
used with a logit link function and weakly informative priors, using the R package brms 
(Bürkner, 2017). The results shown in the lower part of Table 5 indicate that there is a strong 
effect of the acceptance of (the invalid) A-to-and inferences on the probability of accepting 
and-to-if inferences. Figure 5 reports the expectations of the posterior predictions of models 
M4-M6 weighted by their Akaike weights from Table 5 for a new participant. 
                    Figure 5. Posterior predictions for New Participants  
 
 
Note. The posterior predictions for acceptance of the and-to-if 
inference (ANDIF) for new participants based on their acceptance 
of the invalid a-to-and inferences (AAND) and low/middle/high 
quantiles of perceived consistency across sessions 1 and 2. The 
posterior predictions of the models have been weighted by the 
Akaike weight from Table 5. 
 
 
The effect indicates that the participants are more likely to accept the and-to-if inference if 
they incorrectly accepted the A-to-and inference (bAAND_accept = -0.57, 95%-CI [-0.658, -
0.485], BFH0H1 = -2.75 * 10-26 ≈ 0). Transforming from the logit scale, this gives an increase 
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of 36% chance of accepting the and-if-inference based on accepting the invalid A-to-and 
inference. In contrast, there is only a weak effect for the acceptance of the and-to-if inference 
based on acceptance of the valid and-to-A inference (bANDA_accept = 0.09, 95%-CI [-0.001, 
0.184], BFH0H1 = 17.17), which makes M5 the second most preferred model. 
 
Discussion 
 Overall, the results show that participants' endorsed interpretation of the conditional in 
the Scorekeeping Task and their own judgments of internal consistency across the two 
sessions were poor predictors of accepted entailments. In general, the participants accepted an 
uncontroversial example of a valid inference rule (A and C ⊨ A?), and rejected an 
uncontroversial example of an invalid inference rule (A ⊨ A and C?), across relevance 
conditions. It was found that the participants’ performance with and-to-if inferences (A and C 
⊨ if A, then C?) resembled their performance for the invalid A-to-and inferences more than 
for the valid and-to-A inferences. Moreover, the results indicated that the participants' 
acceptance of and-to-if entailments was most strongly predicted by their acceptance of the 
invalid A-to-and entailment. 
 Applying the Principle of Tolerance amounts to empirically investigating how far we 
can succeed in reconstructing internally consistent competence models of the participants. 
Accordingly, the participants classified as adopting ST in session 1 of Experiment 3 were 
expected to accept the and-to-if entailment in session 2, and the participants conforming to DP 
in session 1 were expected to reject it across relevance conditions. Instead, what we found 
was that both groups tended to reject and-to-if entailments to the same degree as they rejected 
the invalid A-to-and entailments. For the participants following DP, this response pattern is 
still consistent with their assigned competence model. But for the participants following ST, 
rejecting the and-to-if entailment looks like an error, and the fact that the acceptance of the 
and-to-if entailment is best predicted by acceptance of the invalid A-to-and entailment leaves 
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little room for reconstructing the participants’ performance as rational. The problem is that we 
cannot conceive of a competence model under which the acceptance of A-to-and entailments 
can be considered as anything but a reasoning error. 
 
Summary of Case Study 
The literature on formal systems of reasoning has branched out into a series of competing 
frameworks. Insofar as psychology seeks to model realistic reasoning performance, 
psychological investigations need to come to terms with the fact that there is often more than 
one competence model that could plausibly be applied to the participants’ performance. 
 In this paper, we put forward a normative and experimental framework for studying 
reasoning performance in a multiple-norms environment. We applied the Principle of Charity 
when obtaining independent evidence of the participants’ parameter settings before evaluating 
their reasoning performance. Using Bayesian mixture modeling we classifed the participants’ 
interpretations of conditionals at the individual level. Moreover, we elicit the participants’ 
reflective attitudes through a novel Scorekeeping Task, where the participants commit 
themselves to a particular interpretation in a case of norm conflicts by criticizing and 
sanctioning their peers. We apply the Principle of Tolerance by permitting the participants to 
approach the reasoning tasks with multiple competing formal frameworks while enforcing the 
requirement that the participants are at least internally consistent in order for them to count as 
competently implementing any one of them. 
 In Experiment 1, it was found that two groups of participants could be identified that 
interpret the indicative conditional differently by either using conditionals to engage in 
suppositional reasoning (ST) or to express reason relations (DP). DP is by far the largest 
group, both using the classifications of the participants’ case judgments in phase 1 and the 
classifications of the participants’ reflective attitudes in the Scorekeeping Task. When the 
results of the uncertain and-to-if inference task are analyzed relative to these individual 
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profiles across relevance conditions, we find that both groups conform to the theorem of 
probability theory that P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) at above-chance levels, but only one of the groups 
conforms to P(if A, then C) ≥ P(A,C) across relevance conditions. This behavior matches the 
interpretations of the conditionals that the participants were assigned to at the individual level. 
 In addition, the Online Supplementary Materials reports data showing that the 
alternative hypothesis that the DP participants were following a defective interpretation of 
probabilities, which would make them more inclined to commit the conjunction fallacy, could 
not be supported by the results.  
Based on the results from Experiment 1, it then appears that what could look like a 
reasoning error at the group level in an earlier study (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2017a) disguises 
two distinct interpretations of the conditional at the individual level, each of which is 
consistently followed by different participants in the uncertain and-to-if inference task.  
Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1 and showed that they 
can be generalized to novel items in the irrelevance condition (see Online Supplementary 
Materials).  
In Experiment 3, we evaluated the cross-task consistency of our results by conducting 
an experiment with both the Scorekeeping Task and entailment judgments. Results showed 
that participants, irrespective of their classification as adhering to ST or DP, largely rejected 
and-to-if entailments. In fact, the acceptance of such entailments was well predicted by the 
acceptance of the invalid A-to-and inference. Together, these results suggest that for 
individuals classified as ST, it is likely that they are committing a reasoning error. 
 The general tendency to reject the entailment of and-to-if inferences has long-reaching 
implications as they are valid on many accounts of indicative and counterfactual conditionals, 
including Pearl's (2000) system, which figures centrally in recent work on causation and 
counterfactual reasoning (Over, 2017; Lucas & Kemp, 2015). It is possible that prior exposure 
to irrelevance items in session 1 accounts for why most of the participants allowed for the 
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possibility of 'if A then C' being false while 'A and C' is true in session 2. However, if the ST 
participants were performing the Ramsey test, then the conditional should be trivially true 
when considering a situation where the conjunction is true and so it still counts as an error. 
One possible explanation for these results is that adherence to ST is less stable than adherence 
to DP.    
 Another anticipated reaction to these results consists in pointing to pragmatic 
processes modulating the semantic content postulated by ST. However, these pragmatic 
processes need to be fleshed out and receive independent validation. In Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2019), the most popular of such approaches, based on conversational implicatures, was found 
not to be supported by the results. Instead, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. argue that the data from 
numerous experiments are most consistent with a conventional implicature interpretation. 
Conventional implicatures make up a second layer of semantic content as lexicalized parts of 
the meaning of the sentences in which they occur (Potts, 2007). Since conventional 
implicatures do not affect the primary truth conditions of these sentences, they are expected to 
enrich the conditions of rational assertability beyond truth evaluations. Accordingly, if the 
participants in Experiment 3 interpreted the task as concerning preservation of rational 
assertability rather than truth preservation, it is possible to account for the results based on a 
conventional implicature. But in that case, it would be a conventional implicature pointing 
towards the DP interpretation of the conditional and the interpretation assigned to the ST 
group would still have been found to be less stable.  
  
Implications for Rationality Research 
Schurz & Hertwig (2019) seek to re-open the discussion of which formal system is the most 
optimal way of reasoning by comparing reasoning systems in terms of their ability to solve a 
prediction problem that contributes to the agent’s cognitive success across different 
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environments. As part of their argument, Schurz and Hertwig assume that the problem of 
arbitrating between norms based on conflicting intuitions may be insolvable. 
 The focus of this paper is not on the evaluative question of which formal system is the 
most optimal way of reasoning. Instead, we approached the problem of how to assign norm-
adherence to participants when multiple conflicting norms are possible—facing the problem 
of arbitration head-on. The case study illustrates how this normative issue may be approached 
empirically, and how this can lead to novel, empirical insight. In the final part of the paper, 
we draw out the key lessons from the case study and set these in the wider context of the role 
of normative theories in research on human cognition.   
Whereas traditional normative research in the psychology of reasoning has largely 
been focused on developing experimental tasks that have one correct solution so that absolute 
attributions of reasoning errors can be made, this reorientation permits designing tasks where 
the availability of competing approaches only permit relative attributions of reasoning errors 
based on independent evidence of the participants’ own parameter settings (see also Stenning 
and van Lambalgen, 2008; Elqayam, 2012).  
 Consequently we seek to empirically reconstruct the participants' subjective 
standpoints in order to assess the participants' performance based on their own internal 
standards. We use empirical data to investigate the extent to which we can use people’s 
normative behaviour towards others to reconstruct internally-consistent competence models. 
In general, normative theories can be evaluated from an external perspective by considering 
which theory is best justified as encoding the correct principles of reasoning, or by attempting 
to identify a theory-neutral notion of cognitive success (Schurz, 2014). Alternatively, 
normative theories can be from an internal perspective by considering whether the agents 
committed to a given theory succeed in managing their beliefs in a way that is consistent with 
their own evaluative standards (Steinberger, 2018). An example would be to identify lack of 
transitivity in an agent’s preferences/choices while presupposing the agent's way of setting up 
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the decision problem. In contrast, reasoning errors in decision making are judged from an 
external point of view when assessing the parameter settings of the decision problem as the 
agent construes the decision problem. Examples would be to probe whether the agent takes all 
of the relevant outcomes into account and assigns them the right probability (Bermudez, 2011, 
Chap. 3).     
     Both the internal and external perspectives matter, and both, we argue, are essential to 
understanding human behaviour. Given the importance of normative considerations, we 
welcome recent debate about the proper role of normative theories in the study of cognition 
(e.g., Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Elqayam & Over, 2016). There is much in psychological 
research practice that can benefit from methodological clarification, and those debates have 
helped identify areas of confusion. Such confusion should be avoided, but not at the expense 
of moving normative considerations outside the purview of psychological theory. Rather, it 
seems essential to understand and employ both the descriptive and the normative in their 
proper place and the way successful psychological research combines the two.  
To be clear: Fallacious is-ought inferences arise when psychologists attempt to infer 
which theory is best justified as a normative theory of reasoning based on the participants' 
responses themselves (Elqayam & Evans, 2011). This, however, is arguably not what authors 
in the reasoning literature have sought to do. In particular, Oaksford and Chater (2007) argued 
that probability theory provides a framework that is better suited to the goal of everyday 
uncertain reasoning (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1991), and that that, in turn, provides a reason 
for why participants might construe (and sometimes misconstrue) what experimenters 
considered to be logical reasoning tasks as probabilistic ones. In other words, the paradigm 
shift in the reasoning literature from deduction to probabilistic reasoning combined external 
considerations about what type of reasoning would be efficacious in everyday contexts, that 
is, an instrumental, normative consideration, with evaluation of participant responses to infer 
that that kind of reasoning was indeed what participants were, descriptively, engaged in.  
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Our case study helps clarify this, by showing how the descriptive work of norm 
attribution is distinct, and pursued separately from questions about the foundations for the 
normative status of those putative ‘norms’ themselves. What norms people follow is a 
different question from what makes those ‘norms’ norms. Hence it is entirely possible to 
pursue the attribution question non-fallaciously. This matters because, arguably, normative 
theories have been incredibly valuable to psychology, and, it would be detrimental to abandon 
them. For example, the so-called probabilistic turn in reasoning (or the “new paradigm”) has 
widely been hailed a success (e.g., Evans, 2012), but that ‘turn’ was directly fueled by an 
interest in what participants should do, that is, by normative questions.  
Normatively motivated research has given rise to tighter, better models than before: 
Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) work prompted the first quantitative models of what had 
traditionally been viewed as ‘logical’ reasoning tasks, thus providing considerable descriptive 
gains over previous theoretical accounts of these tasks which had merely predicted directional 
differences across experimental conditions (see Hahn, 2009).  
 In fact, this is not an isolated, historic coincidence. Closely related to reasoning, the 
last decade has seen a rise of interest in argumentation within cognitive psychology. Long 
seen as the purview solely of philosophy and education (for exceptions see, Rips 1998, 2002; 
Rips et al., 1999), what empirical work there was (see e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Aufschnaiter et al. 
2007) was limited by the lack of resolution in the available normative standards: logic had 
little to say about everyday informal argument and the extremely limited evaluative 
framework of the Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1957) afforded only very crude tools for studying 
argumentation. The Toulmin framework asks simply whether claims are given reasons in 
support, and whether those reasons have themselves been challenged, but lacks any means to 
evaluate the quality of those reasons or challenges. Bayesian argumentation has enabled 
quantitative prediction about very specific factors, such as source reliability, strength of 
arguments and their interaction, in a way that intersects with large body of work on evidential 
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and causal reasoning (e.g., Pearl, 1988; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Hahn & Oaksford, 
2009; Fenton, Neil & Lagnado, 2013; Sloman & Lagnado, 2015, and references therein). In 
other words, developments with respect to normative theories have extended the 
methodological arsenal of psychologists and the substantive research questions that can be 
pursued. 
Furthermore, this is in no way limited to reasoning or reasoning related areas such as 
argumentation. Normative considerations are pervasive across cognition from perception, 
through judgement and decision-making, categorization to various aspects of language 
processing and language acquisition. Here too, normative models have driven theoretical 
research, both in terms of questions asked and in terms of methodology (for examples, see 
e.g., Hahn, 2014 and references therein). For example, ideal observer analysis which has had 
tremendous success in the study of perception (e.g., Geisler, 2012) draws on the formal tools 
of probability and decision theory to specify a model of optimal performance given the 
available input for a task. Behavioural studies then compare actual human performance to the 
performance of this ideal agent (see e.g., Geisler, 1989; Legge, Klitz, & Tjan, 1997; Sims, 
Jacobs, & Knill, 2012). In a process of iterative refinement, human performance and ideal 
observer are brought into ever closer correspondence by incorporating into the ideal observer 
details of the human system. Ideal observer analysis is a tool for clarifying mechanism and 
process that seeks to understand the system as ‘doing the best it can do’ given the available 
hardware. It combines descriptive and normative by linking up behavioural prediction, 
mechanistic and functional explanation, in what can be viewed as a methodological 
formalization of the principle of charity. Many of the most high-profile studies in the field of 
perception in the last decade fall under this general approach (e.g., Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
Najemnik & Geisler, 2005; Hillis, Ernst, Banks & Landy, 2002). 
Within cognitive psychology, similar programs can be found under the header of 
bounded rationality or bounded optimality. Howes et al. (2009), for example, stress how 
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rational norms can aid the disambiguation between competing theories and assist in the 
identification of underlying cognitive universals above and beyond the demand characteristics 
of experimental tasks. However, probably the most consequential in terms of sheer volume of 
research has been the advent of the use of optimal models from economic theory as an 
organizing framework for cognitive neuroscience and neuro-biology (e.g., Glimcher, 2004; 
Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Glimcher et al., 2009; and references therein; Trommershäuser,  
Maloney, & Landy, 2009, and references therein). Here, what is optimal provides a bound on 
what is a priori possible, against which actual performance can then be compared in order to –
descriptively – understand it. This shift, and the flood of research it has prompted, was 
brought about not by an interest in ‘rationality’, but by the increasing realization that thinking 
about neural processes purely in terms of ‘reflex’-based approaches is inadequate (Glimcher, 
2004).  
 In the context of all of this research, ranging from neuro-biology and neuroscience, 
through perception to decision-making, reasoning and argumentation, normative and 
descriptive questions need to be distinguished (else fallacious is-ought inferences may indeed 
ensue). But it is equally erroneous to think of these questions as entirely separate, as 
recommendations of ‘descriptivism’ seem to imply. The claim there seems to be that 
normative theories such as Bayes’ rule may be taken simply descriptively as “computational 
level theories”, stripping them of their ‘normative baggage’ (Elqayam & Evans, 2011; 
Elqayam, 2012). Presumably, this intended interpretive switch is expected to leave empirical 
research not just without loss, but actually improved. What that gain is meant to consist of, is, 
however, left unclear. More importantly, however, it seems unlikely that present programs 
could be sustained without loss: this is because these recommendations, arguably, misconstrue 
what computational level theories actually are. In Marr’s words, a computational level theory 
involves the following: 
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“Its important features are (1) that it contains separate arguments about what is 
computed and why and (2) that the resulting operation is defined uniquely by the 
constraints it has to satisfy.” (Marr, 1982: p. 23)  
Normative considerations are essential here. They provide a functional explanation, which 
explicates "what is computed" in terms of inferentially characterized capacities that introduce 
a criterion for correct/incorrect performance (Cummins, 1983) and specifies an answer to the 
“why?” question by specifying the benefits to the agent of following those recommendations. 
On such benefits, the normative frameworks of classical logic and probability theory have 
offered powerful reasons for adherence: probabilistic coherence protects from bets against 
nature one cannot win, probabilistic coherence coupled with the use of Bayes’ rule for belief 
revision minimizes the inaccuracy of our beliefs (as measured by the Brier score, Pettigrew, 
2016), and maximise expected utility (Rosenkrantz, 1992).  
 While mere “endorsement” of a rule or procedure may suffice (at least in some 
circumstances) to establish a normative basis (see e.g. the discussion in Hart, 1994; Corner & 
Hahn, 2013), such endorsement, in and of itself, provides no basis for the functional level 
explanation that computational level theories seek to provide. That question is asking why 
something would be a good thing for me to do, not just whether or not I want to do it. That 
‘why’ is what the ‘pragmatic’ justification of any putatively normative theory must address. 
And because that justification is ‘external’, it can be separated from the internal perspective 
that norm attribution empirically requires.  
The requirements of computational level theories are also not undercut by pointing to 
linguistics as a role model for a purely descriptive use of competence models as Elqayam and  
Evans (2011) do. The basis of their analogy between linguistics and psychology is the 
following observation. The study of language has long drawn on competence/performance 
distinctions to bridge the gap between the utterances a particular grammar might license and 
those that are observed in actual real-world utterances. In the study of language, research 
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aimed at seeking to identify the competence model (grammar), is entirely distinct from 
question of whether that competence model is prescriptive or not. “Grammar” in the context 
of linguistics is not a prescriptive notion embodying a concept of ‘good language’ but a 
generative system that allows language users to generate well-formed sentences, where ‘well-
formedness is relative to specific grammar, and the grammars of different English speakers 
need not be, and will not be exactly the same. 
 However, ‘well-formedness” is itself an inherently normative notion. So Elqayam and 
Evans (2011) miss the mark when they suggest that “Competence” is not intended to be 
contrasted with “incompetence,” but rather with performance, that is, the instantiation of 
linguistic competence in actual speech" (p. 239). This makes it sound as if no delineations 
between competence vs. incompetence (or grammaticality vs. ungrammaticality) are drawn in 
syntax. This is not true. For much of the past 75 years, the distinction between allowed and 
disallowed sentences within a language have formed the basic datum of linguistic research. In 
keeping with this, the most elementary criterion of success for any putative grammar is so-
called “descriptive adequacy”: that is, the ability to correctly identify the well-formed 
sentences of the language while rejecting the ill-formed ones. Hence theoretical work on 
acceptability judgments in descriptive grammar like Schütze (1996), which is continuous with 
contemporary, experimental syntax (Myers, 2009; Sprouse & Almeida, 2013), contains 
extensive discussion of “good”/”bad” sentences, degrees of badness, deviances, error, 
violation, and grammatical/ungrammatical sentences. For example, it is often viewed as an 
error to reject a sentence containing center-embedding (e.g. “The man who the boy who the 
students recognized pointed out is a friend of mine”) as ungrammatical just because of 
difficulties with parsing it (Chomsky, 1965).  
When theoreticians like Sampson (2007) suggest that linguists should dispense with 
the grammatical/ungrammatical distinction, and turn to a bottom-up approach based on corpus 
analysis, he is making a radical suggestion in direct opposition to decades of linguistic 
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practice that has unsurprisingly spawned considerable debate (e.g., Kertész & Rákosi, 2008). 
In this debate Sampson (2007) is immediately contradicted by linguists like Pollum (2007) 
who state that linguistics is inherently normative and relies on the method of reflective 
equilibrium. Importantly, it remains common ground in this debate that theoretical linguistics 
should not return to the prescriptive grammar often associated with the eighteenth or 
nineteenth century (Beal, 2009). Rather the discussion concerns the use of competence 
models for the purposes of descriptive grammar, which have an inherent normative content. 
What separates linguistics from other areas of cognitive science concerned, in one 
form or other, is primarily that linguists typically spend little time with considerations of 
external justification for the normative notions they employ (but see e.g. Pereira, 2000; Aylett 
and Turk, 2004; Levy and Jaeger, 2007, on the rise of normative frameworks such as 
information theory, or Bergen, Levy and Goodman, 2016 on game theory). However, it is 
also, arguably, a mistake to think of internal and external justification as entirely unrelated. 
Crucially, the ‘why’ of functional explanations is also inferentially informative with respect to 
what it is I want to do, without that inference being a fallacious ought-to-is. The reason such 
non-fallacious inference from ought to is may be required is because of the identifiability 
problem. Any not directly observable ‘theory’ will be under-determined by the data (see e.g., 
Stanford, 2017). But this general, methodological problem is exacerbated in the context of 
human behaviour, because any specific behavioural response will be influenced by many 
factors. As a consequence, actual behaviour will only ever approximate a computational level 
theory, raising the explanatory (and inductive) question of how approximate is approximate 
enough.  
These difficulties are well-illustrated by competence theories in linguistics and 
psycholinguistics. An underlying grammar is not directly observable, and can be identified 
only via inductively fallible empirical measures: for example, acceptability judgments 
tracking grammaticality, reaction times, or rating tasks. Crucially, these identification 
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inferences about the competence theory are made entirely without recourse to justificatory 
concerns. Likewise, in our case studies, we treat the different normative systems participants 
might be seeking to apply as (mere) competence models that we are seeking to identify, 
without trying to address questions about their normative status per se. 
However, normative concerns can be informative for this otherwise entirely 
descriptive pursuit, because they too can help with the identification problem. Many 
competence theories will, in principle, explain the same finite set of behavioural data. 
Considerations other than data fit can provide additional constraints that help prune that set: 
That it would be useful to act a certain way provides a defeasible piece of evidence in support 
of the fact that that is what I am, in fact, trying to do. It is not sufficient (that would indeed be 
erroneous is-to-ought inference) but it is similarly fallacious to hold that such utility 
consideration have no evidential value. And claiming that it doesn’t would be directly at odds 
with our most basic routines for understanding the utterances and actions of others, not just in 
science, but in our daily lives. This is what principles of charity encapsulate, and throwing 
away functional considerations is simply throwing away an important methodological tool. 
In all of this, the normative work itself needs to be done: some independent reason for 
why a procedure is normative needs to be explicitly established, and that reason must connect 
meaningfully with actual goals of the agent. ‘Descriptivism’ as advocated by Elqayam and 
colleagues doesn’t obviate the need for that: one still needs to do the normative work. And 
that work may be hard because agents may have multiple epistemic (and non-epistemic) 
goals. But stepping away from normative theories altogether comes at too heavy a cost. 
What is required are not broad brushstroke solutions, but detailed engagement with the 
issues in the context of particular problems. There is a need to refine the methodological 
arsenal, not to restrict it. This is what we have sought to provide with the present case study:  
 What we hope to have shown is that there is a fruitful role that normative theorizing 
can play in experimental psychology that consists in making internal evaluations of the 
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participants' performance based on competence models assigned on the individual level, even 
for cases where multiple, conflicting norms can be applied. We thereby directly address the 
problem of arbitration, which is one of the main practical problems that Elqayam and Evans 
(2011) point to in the application of norms to empirical investigations of reasoning.    
 The Scorekeeping Task constitutes a new tool for measuring the participants' reflective 
attitudes. It is the reflective attitudes that competence theories of human reasoning generally 
aim to describe (e.g., Macnamara, 1986), very much like how judgments of grammaticality 
are supposed to reveal our linguistic competence (e.g., Chomsky, 1965). Yet in studies of 
reasoning, experimental procedures for measuring the participants' considered judgments have 
been neglected. The central idea behind the Scorekeeping Task is that the participants' norm 
adherence is revealed by the norms they use to criticize and sanction their peers with. One 
domain where the Scorekeeping task appears to be particularly promising is decision making 
under risk and uncertainty, where a considerable amount of theoretical developments has been 
based on the rejection of certain norms (e.g., Allais, 1953; Birnbaum, 2008; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  For example, Birnbaum and colleagues have reported a series of ‘choice 
paradoxes’ that reject Cumulative Prospect Theory (for a review, see Birnbaum, 2008). 
Different accounts attempt to accommodate these paradoxes by attributing them to attention 
biases, distractions, differential weighting of better/worse outcomes, among other notions 
(e.g., Cenci et al., 2014; Pandey, 2018). One could use the Scorekeeping Task to determine 
whether individuals’ judgments are consistent with their sanctioning of others’ choices. These 
results should be able to clarify exactly which paradoxes can be attributed to some kind of 
perceptual/reasoning errors (e.g., violations of stochastic dominance), and which indeed 
reflect the core principles underlying the comparison of options (e.g., a viewpoint-dependent 
weighting of outcomes). Important here is the notion that no one-size-fits-all solution is likely 
to work, given the heterogeneity that is consistently found across individuals (see 
Regenwetter & Robinson, 2017). 
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Conclusion 
A normative and empirical framework was put forward in this paper for attributing 
reasoning errors in cases where there are multiple, conflicting norms that could serve as 
competence models. A new task was introduced for eliciting the participants' reflective 
attitudes, and individual profiles of the participants were made, which assessments of correct 
and incorrect reasoning were made relative to.  
In the case study of conditional reasoning, it was seen that at least two interpretations 
of indicative conditionals could be separated based on the participants' probability 
assignments, and that the participants consistently followed these interpretations when 
assigning probabilities to the conclusions of uncertain and-to-if inferences. In a third 
experiment, it was found, however, that when the participants were tested after a temporal 
delay in a task eliciting entailment judgments, only one of these two groups of participants 
showed a consistent pattern by rejecting the entailment from and-to-if just as in their 
probability assignments in the uncertain and-to-if task. Moreover, participants' own 
assessment of how consistently they had responded across experimental sessions turned out to 
be an unreliable guide.  
The results thus have repercussions for how possible it is to internally reconstruct 
consistent competence models of participants when reasoning with conditionals. In short, we 
demonstrated the utility of our method by showing novel and interesting empirical 
conclusions for the psychology of reasoning. However, the method itself is entirely general, 
and can be used in any domain in which normative considerations guide descriptive research 
(e.g. decision making).  
Finally, the case studies of this paper allowed us to clarify both the importance of 
normative theories to the descriptive understanding of individual’s behaviour and to entangle 
some of the confusions about seemingly fallacious is-to-ought inferences highlighted by the 
recent literature. Setting aside normative theories in psychology would mean setting aside a 
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rich source of interesting research questions and a central methodological tool. This makes it 
imperative that psychological research gets the conceptual issues right. 
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Online Supplementary Materials:9 Bayesian Mixture Model 
The Bayesian mixture model developed here builds on previous regression-based 
efforts to characterize the different probabilities elicited from individuals (Singmann et al., 
2013; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016, 2017a): Generally speaking, for each individual, the 
elicited values of P(C|A) were used to predict the elicited probability P(if A then C) 
concerning the same antecedent A and consequent C: 
P(if A then C) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1P(C|A) +  𝜀, 
where 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are the intercept and slope parameters respectively, and 𝜀 is the residual 
term.10 Parameter estimates were then used to evaluate ST and DP accounts across relevance 
conditions. Given the conditional probability hypothesis is key to ST, it can be argued that this 
theoretical account expects 𝛽0 and 𝛽1to be 0 and 1, respectively. In contrast, the alternative 
DP account expects 𝛽1 to take on value 1 in the case of positive relevance (PO) but to take on 
positive values less than one in irrelevance (IR) and negative relevance (NE) conditions, 
reflecting the penalty that follows from the lack of a (positive) inferential relation between the 
antecedent A and the consequent C. An evaluation of the two theoretical accounts is then 
made possible by comparing 𝛽1 estimates across relevance conditions. For example, 
                                                 
9  Further supplemental materials including all data and analysis scripts are available at: 
https://osf.io/9fm45/. 
10  For clarity purposes, this description omits subscripts denoting participant and trial, 
and also glosses over the random-effects structures that enable the estimation of individual 
differences around group-level means. 
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Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016, 2017a) reported 𝛽1estimates in the irrelevance and negative 
relevance conditions that were significantly smaller than in the positive relevance condition, 
in line with the predictions of DP. 
The accompanying evaluation of (chance-corrected) probabilistic coherence was based 
on an approach originally proposed by Evans et al. (2015). As an example, consider the case 
of the uncertain and-to-if inference, according to which P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) for ST. 
Assume that if the elicited probabilities are produced by a pure guessing process, then this 
process yields probabilities that are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. It follows that 
given an elicited value for P(Premise), a guessing-based elicitation would respect 
P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) with probability 1-P(Premise). Now, consider a dichotomous 
random variable XUAI, which takes on value 1 when P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) is respected, 
and 0 when it does not. In order to evaluate whether conformity to P(Conclusion) ≥ 
P(Premise) occurs at an above-chance rate, one simply has to test whether the difference 
between XUAI and 1-P(Premise), computed across trials and individuals, is reliably larger than 
0. For example, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a) showed that this difference was significantly 
above chance in the positive relevance condition, but not in the negative relevance and 
irrelevance conditions. 
Despite its merits, the regression-based approach used so far suffers from important 
limitations. First, it assumes that the error term ε follows a Normal distribution with mean 
zero and variance 𝜎𝜀2. This error distribution attributes non-zero probability to the occurrence 
of elicited values outside the 0%-100% scale used. The problem here is not limited to the fact 
that impossible values are deemed possible by the model, but the fact that this unbounded 
“error theory” overlooks the important biasing role that errors can have in the occurrence of 
empirical phenomena such as conservatism, subadditivity, and conjunction/disjunction 
fallacies (see Costello & Watts, 2014; Hilbert, 2012). For example, for low/high probabilities, 
errors will systematically lead to elicitations that are biased upwards/downwards. One 
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consequence of these biases is an overestimation of 𝛽0 and an underestimation of 𝛽1 (for a 
detailed discussion, see Hilbert, 2012). 
The second limitation concerns the fact that the adopted regression approach assumes 
that individuals vary in terms of degree, but not in kind. Given the notion that individuals can 
rely on different norms (some might be in line with ST, others with DP), the regression 
model’s tacit assumption that all individuals belong to the same group is ultimately 
unsatisfactory. For example, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a) provided evidence in terms of a 
group-level 𝛽1estimates below 1 and the occurrence of conformity to P(Conclusion) ≥ 
P(Premise) at below-chance rates for IR and NE. These results are silent on the actual 
proportion of individuals that adhere to either ST or DP, and whether the compliance rates 
with respect to predictions such as the inequality for the uncertain and-to-if inference differs 
between these two groups. 
In order to overcome these limitations, we developed a Bayesian mixture model 
according to which the predicted relationship between P(if A, then C) and P(C|A) is 
determined by that individual’s adherence to ST or DP. In the positive relevance condition, 
for individual i and a pair j of elicited P(if A, then C) and P(C|A) concerning a given 
antecedent A and consequent C: 
𝑃(𝑖𝑖 𝐴, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐶)𝑖,𝑗 =  �    𝑃(𝐶| 𝐴)𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗 ,           𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 0, 1,𝛽𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,                       𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 2,  
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 come from a truncated Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜀2 (see the 
left panel of Figure 1). This distribution is truncated between 0 and 100 in order to limit 
predictions to the permitted range of responses and to mitigate the biases expected in noisy 
elicitations (see Costello & Watts, 2014; Hilbert, 2012). The indicator variable 𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃denotes 
whether participant i in the positive relevance condition follows ST (𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 0), DP (𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 =1), or a saturated model (𝑤𝑖𝑃𝑃 = 2). The latter model can account for any data (it has one 
parameter 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 per trial pair) and allows us to identify the individuals that cannot be well 
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accounted by either ST or DP (for a discussion, see Hilbig & Moshagen, 2014). In the cases 
of ST and DP, it is assumed that the individual equates P(if A, then C) and P(C|A). 
In the absence of a (positive) reason relation between the antecedent A and consequent 
C the two accounts make diverging predictions. In the IR condition the predictions are: 
𝑃(𝑖𝑖 𝐴, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐶)𝑖,𝑗 =  �𝑃(𝐶| 𝐴)𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,                𝑤𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 0,𝜃𝑖𝑃(𝐶| 𝐴)𝑖,𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,             𝑤𝑖𝐼𝐼 = 1, 
where 𝜃𝑖 is the discount-penalty parameter of DP-adherent individual i. The range of 
predictions (excluding noise) made by the two models are illustrated in Figure 1.  
The mixture model was implemented in a Bayesian framework: In a nutshell, the information 
(or ignorance) regarding the model parameters is represented by prior distributions. The 
observed data is then used to update our knowledge about the parameters, resulting in 
posterior parameter distributions (Gelman et al., 2014; Kruschke, 2014; M. D. Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). Based on the posterior probabilities of the indicator variables 𝑤𝑖 we 
can easily classify each individual per condition as adherents of ST, DP, or neither (see M. D. 
Lee, 2016). 
One important aspect of these model-based classifications is that they take into 
account the flexibility of the two accounts (for a discussion, see M. D. Lee, 2016). As shown 
in Figure 1, whereas ST is bound to predict that data follow the main diagonal, DP is also able 
to accommodate data falling along a monotonic function below the main diagonal, with ST 
being a special case of DP when 𝜃 = 1. Given that there is currently no theoretical claim with 
respect to the shape of this function, we are assuming that it is linear. Due to its greater 
flexibility, the classification is therefore biased against DP, requiring sufficient evidence from 
the data in order to justify the additional flexibility.  
The key parameters of interest in this analysis are the posterior probabilities of wi  = 1 
obtained in the positive relevance and irrelevance conditions. In the positive relevance 
condition, when the mean of this posterior probability was estimated to be below or equal to 
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.50, the individual was classified as following the saturated model. When the mean is 
estimated to be larger than .50, the individual was classified as following ST/DP. In the 
irrelevance condition, these same ranges of values led to the ST and DP classifications, 
respectively. 
The individual classifications were used to produce different, chance-corrected 
estimates of probabilistic-coherence phenomena such as: 
P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise)  
P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C) 
Specifically, we estimated how much the observed rate of probabilistic-coherent 
elicitations deviates from chance, a deviation that was quantified on an effect-size scale. We 
can then test whether the posterior distribution of these deviations is reliably above or below 
zero by inspecting whether the value zero is included in their 95% credibility intervals (i.e. 
Φ(Ki,j) = 1 – P(Premise); Kruschke, 2016).  
For participant i, the probability that her response to a given item-pair j conformed to a 
given inequality is given by Φ(Δi + Ki,j), with Φ() being the probability function of the 
standard Normal distribution. Parameter Ki,j is a correction term for participant i and item-pair 
j such that Φ(Ki,j) corresponds to the probability that the responses to a given item-pair were 
inequality-conforming by chance alone (Singmann, Klauer, & Over, 2014). Parameter Δi 
corresponds to that individual’s displacement from chance (i.e., when Δi is positive, that 
individual produces inequality-conforming responses at an above-chance rate). Using a 
hierarchical framework, these individual parameters were assumed to come from a Normal 
group-level distribution, with mean µΔ and standard deviation σΔ. If individuals in general 
conform to P(Conclusion) ≥ P(Premise) or P(C|A) ≥ P(A,C), then their respective µΔ should 
be consistently above 0 (i.e., the probability of µΔ being below 0 should be very small). These 
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parameters were estimated separately for individuals classified as ST and DP in the 
irrelevance condition. 
A very similar hierarchical approach was used to model the relative probability of an 
individual judging the no-difference justification (in line with ST) as most convincing after 
having seen both sides, as well as the relative probability attributing the HIT to such 
justification. We also used the individual classifications to test for differences in theoretically-
relevant variables, such as the occurrence of conjunction fallacies (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983), the interpretation of probability (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999), manifestations of 
argumentative skills (Kuhn, 1991), and demographic variables such as college education and 
training in probability (see below). 
The ranking of probability interpretations was analyzed using a Thurstonian model 
assuming that the probability of a given rank-order corresponds to that probability that a 
sample from latent distributions (one distribution per interpretation) produces that rank order. 
These latent distributions are assumed to be Normal with a given mean and variance. We 
assumed that all distributions are Gaussian and have the same variance (a common 
assumption in these models, see Kellen & Klauer, 2018). Without loss of generality, we fixed 
the mean of one of these interpretations to zero. Details on the estimation of these parameters 
can be found elsewhere (M. D. Lee, Steyvers, & Miller, 2014; Yao & Böckenholt, 1999). 
The posterior-parameter distributions of the mixture model were estimated via Gibbs 
sampling using the general-purpose software JAGS (Plummer, 2003). Chain convergence was 
confirmed via the R-hat statistic and visual inspection. 
The phase-1 classifications obtained in Experiment 2 are given in Figure A1, whereas 
the coherence measures are provided in Figure A2.  
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Figure A1. Left and Center Panels: Individual data associated to the phase 1 classifications in 
Experiment 2. Right Panels: Individuals’ posterior classifications (note that in the irrelevance 
condition, only participants classified as ST/DP in the positive relevance condition were considered). 
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Figure A2. Posterior distributions of the deviations of the tested inequalities from 
chance-level occurrence (represented on an effect-size scale) in Experiment 2. The 
vertical lines indicate effect size 0 and BP corresponds to the probability of samples 
from the posterior distributions taking on values below 0. In the left panels we 
depict the posterior distributions for participants classified as ST and DP (the latter 
corresponding to the more peaked distributions).  
 
 
 
Phase 4 of Experiments 1 and 2: Individual Variation. 
Phase 4 served the purpose of testing for further covariates that would characterize 
participants that were classified as interpreting the conditional according to ST and DP.   
In Experiment 1, phase 4 tested for whether the participants differed in their tendency 
to commit the conjunction fallacy and their interpretation of probability, based on a 
suggestion in Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017a). One possibility is that what distinguishes the 
ST participants from the DP participants is the latter having a defective understanding of 
probabilities. This possibility echoes results previously reported by Tentori, Crupi, and Russo 
(2013), who found that the participants committing the conjunction fallacy are misled by the 
degree of confirmation of the added conjunct. Participants were presented with four pages 
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separated in two blocks. The first block contained the less well-known Bill version of the 
conjunction fallacy task presented in Tversky and Kahneman (1983). Following Hertwig and 
Gigerenzer (1999), the participants were instructed in a second block of phase 4 to help a 
fictive user named Ludwig to understand the instructions of the previous task. The 
participants were told that English was not the native language of Ludwig and that Ludwig 
was a bit uncertain about how to interpret the word ‘probability’. The task of the participants 
was to provide paraphrases of the term ‘probability’ that would help Ludwig understand the 
instructions. To do this, the participants were instructed that they should rank-order 
paraphrases of probability in terms of relative frequencies, propensities, plausibility, and 
subjective degree of belief according to which one was most adequate and that they could 
reselect their responses (see the Supplementary Materials). 
In Experiment 2, phase 4 evaluated individuals’ argumentation skills using an adaption 
of Kuhn’s (1991) task. To classify the participants’ responses a coding manual was written 
based on Kuhn (1991), which three coders applied independently. In this task, the participants 
are assessed for their level of argumentative skills based on their ability to:  
(1) Produce a causal hypothesis about why children fail at school,  
(2) Produce genuine evidence stating a correlation or co-variation that would 
substantiate their claim as opposed to, for instance, providing pseudo-evidence which 
merely elaborates their own theory through illustrations, and arguments from analogy 
or general assumptions about human nature, 
(3) produce a possible counterargument to their own theory targeting, for instance, its 
sufficiency or necessity,  
(4) recognize the principled possibility of error of their own theory, and  
(5) recognize that they are presented with weak, underdetermined evidence, which is 
compatible with several causal hypotheses instead of reading their own theory into the 
evidence. 
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In an extensive coding manual, the coders were instructed how to classify the participants’ 
open-ended responses based on Kuhn’s (1991) conceptual distinctions (see Supplementary 
Materials). Three independent coders classified all of the responses. When there was 
disagreement, a simple majority rule was used.  
 
Phase 4 (Experiment 1). We estimated the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy in the 
context of the Bill case (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983), and evaluated participants’ 
interpretation of probabilities (Gigerenzer & Hertwig, 1999). With respect to the occurrence 
of the conjunction fallacy, the rate at which it occurred was high, but similar across 
individuals adhering to ST (.43 [.26, .59]) and DP (.48 [.40, .55]).  Finally, the ranked 
interpretations of probabilities were analyzed using a Thurstonian model that characterizes 
ranks as samples from latent distributions with different means (M. D. Lee, Steyvers, & 
Miller, 2013; Yao & Böckenholt, 1999). The posterior latent means associated to each 
interpretation of probabilities are reported in Table 3. Overall, the interpretation of 
probabilities as relative frequencies was found to be the most adequate, although the 
considerable overlap observed (in particular among the few individuals adhering to ST) 
precludes any clear-cut conclusions. In any case, there is no indication that individuals 
committing to ST and DP hold very different interpretations of probabilities, such as a shift of 
the DP participants towards an interpretation in terms of plausibility. 
Table 3. Latent Means of the Different Interpretations of Probability in 
Experiment 1 
Interpretation ST DP 
Plausibility 0 0 
Frequency -0.34 [-0.77, 0.10] -0.47 [-0.83, -0.11] 
Degrees of Belief 0.48 [0.03, 0.93]  0.59 [0.24, 0.96] 
Propensity -0.29 [-0.72, 0.13] -0.12 [-0.48, 0.23] 
Note. Lower values are associated with higher ranks (the top rank is 1). The mean of 
‘plausible’ interpretation was fixed to zero without any loss of generality. Values inside the 
square brackets correspond to the 95% credibility intervals. 
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Phase 4 (Experiment 2). We investigated whether there were any differences between the 
individuals classified as ST and DP based on their argumentative skills using our adaptation 
of Kuhn’s (1991) task. To test the agreement of the classifications of argumentative skills by 
our three coders, the intraclass coefficient (ICC) was computed. A substantial agreement 
among the coders was found: ICC(2, 1) = .669 with 95% CI(.579, .739), F(331, 662) = 8.105, 
p < .001.  
 For the phase 1 classification of Experiment 2, the posterior probabilities associated to 
the occurrence of each single argumentative behavior are slightly higher for DP than ST. 
However, their respective 95% credibility intervals overlap. In order to pool the information 
quantified by each of these posterior probabilities, we will rely on the ‘encompassing prior 
approach’ proposed by Klugkist and Hoijtink (2007) and Myung, Karabatsos, and Iverson 
(2008). According to this approach, the support for a given inequality (e.g., values in 
Condition 1 are larger than in Condition 2) provided by the data can be quantified by 
contrasting the probabilities that such inequalities are observed when taking samples from the 
prior and posterior distributions, respectively. In the present case, when we sample 
probabilities of observing the argumentative behaviors from their respective prior 
distributions, the probability that all sampled values from DP are larger than the sampled 
values from ST is only .505 ≈ .03. When sampling from the posterior distributions, this 
probability is roughly .66. This difference suggests that individuals classified as adhering to 
DP manifesting more argumentative behaviors than their ST counterparts becomes roughly 21 
times more likely in light of the data (when compared with a competing hypothesis that 
imposes no pattern whatsoever).  
 However, as Table 4 also shows, these differences in argumentative scores found for 
the phase 1 classification were not found in the phase 2 classifications, with the hypothesis of 
higher argumentative skills for DP adherents only becoming twice as likely in light of the data 
(i.e., there is only anecdotal evidence in support of the hypothesis). 
79 
 
Table 4. Probability of Argumentative Behaviors in Kuhn’s (1991) Task (Experiment 2)  
 ST1 DP1 ST2 DP2 
Generate Alternative Theory .78 [.66, .89] .92 [.87, .95] .86 [.77, .93] .90 [.84, .94] 
Recognizing Possibility of Own Error .52 [.38, .66] .71 [.64, .77] .65 [.53, .76] .69 [.62, .76] 
Evaluate Underdetermined Evidence .15 [.07, .26] .23 [.17, .29] .14 [.07, .23] .20 [.14, .27] 
Provide Genuine Evidence for Own Theory .50 [.36, .65] .69 [.62, .75] .66 [.55, .77] .67 [.60, 74] 
Generate Possible Counterevidence  .40 [.27, .55] .46 [.39, .53] .49 [.38, .61] .44 [.36, .52] 
Note. Posterior probabilities and credibility intervals for the phase 1 classification (ST1, DP1) and phase 2 
classification (ST2, DP2). The evidence variable was recoded such that it shows the median posterior probability 
that the indexed group succeeded in providing genuine evidence for their causal claim. The counterevidence 
variable was recoded such that it displays the median posterior probability that the indexed group succeeded in 
providing strong or weak possible counterevidence against their own theory. See the Supplementary Materials. 
 
 
Demographics. In terms of demographics, we were interested in checking whether the 
individuals classified as adhering to ST and DP differed in terms of college education, and in 
terms of any previous training in probability theory. In the case of individuals classified as ST 
using phase1 responses in Experiments 1/2, the posterior probabilities of having college 
education and training in probability theory were .50 [.33, 67] / .62 [.48, .75] and .29 [.15, 
.45] / .34 [.21, .48], respectively. The analogous probabilities for adherents of DP were 
similar, .68 [.61, 75] / .73 [.66, .79]  and  .41[.34, .49] / .36 [.29, .43]. 
 
Discussion 
In phase 4 in Experiment 1, it was found that the alternative hypothesis could not be 
supported by the results that the DP participants were following a defective interpretation of 
probabilities, which would make them more inclined to commit the conjunction fallacy. 
Moreover, we did not find any systematic differences in whether the participants classified as 
following ST or DP had received probabilistic training. We therefore continue to interpret DP 
as representing a genuine inferential interpretation of the indicative conditional and as not just 
the result of erroneous probability assignments. 
Finally, phase 4 of Experiment 2 also investigated the hypothesis that DP would 
possess stronger argumentative skills than ST, due to their increased focus on reason relations, 
using Kuhn’s (1991) argumentation task, but found little to no support. 
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It is telling that we find the systematic differences that we do in the way participants 
classified as following ST or DP perform on the uncertain and-to-if inference task, in spite of 
the fact that these groups did not generally differ in their tendency to commit the conjunction 
fallacy (Experiment 1), nor in the degree to which they had received college education or 
probability training. Given the size of our samples, we should have been able to detect 
differences in these variables, if there were any of reasonable size. It therefore appears that the 
differences we tap into when investigating the opposition between ST and DP are orthogonal 
to the differences in these further variables.  
 
 
